tg 667d792d6a • Address concerns of Chris Palmer from the Android security team
– possible integer overflows in memory allocation, mostly
    ‣ multiplication: all are checked now
    ‣ addition: reviewed them, most were “proven” or guessed to be
      “almost” impossible to run over (e.g. when we have a string
      whose length is taken it is assumed that the length will be
      more than only a few bytes below SIZE_MAX, since code and
      stack have to fit); some are checked now (e.g. when one of
      the summands is an off_t); most of the unchecked ones are
      annotated now
    ⇒ cost (MirBSD/i386 static): +76 .text
    ⇒ cost (Debian sid/i386): +779 .text  -4 .data
  – on Linux targets, setuid() setresuid() setresgid() can fail
    with EAGAIN; check for that and, if so, warn once and retry
    infinitely (other targets to be added later once we know that
    they are “insane”)
    ⇒ cost (Debian sid/i386): +192 .text (includes .rodata)
• setmode.c: Do overflow checking for realloc() too; switch back
  from calloc() to a checked malloc() for simplification while there
• define -DIN_MKSH and let setmode.c look a tad nicer while here
2010-09-14 21:26:19 +00:00
2010-07-17 22:09:40 +00:00
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