// GoToSocial // Copyright (C) GoToSocial Authors admin@gotosocial.org // SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later // // This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify // it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by // the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or // (at your option) any later version. // // This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, // but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of // MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the // GNU Affero General Public License for more details. // // You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License // along with this program. If not, see . package middleware import ( "context" "crypto/rand" "crypto/sha256" "crypto/subtle" "encoding/hex" "hash" "io" "net/http" "time" apimodel "code.superseriousbusiness.org/gotosocial/internal/api/model" apiutil "code.superseriousbusiness.org/gotosocial/internal/api/util" "code.superseriousbusiness.org/gotosocial/internal/config" "code.superseriousbusiness.org/gotosocial/internal/gtscontext" "code.superseriousbusiness.org/gotosocial/internal/gtserror" "code.superseriousbusiness.org/gotosocial/internal/log" "code.superseriousbusiness.org/gotosocial/internal/oauth" "codeberg.org/gruf/go-byteutil" "github.com/gin-gonic/gin" ) // NoLLaMas returns a piece of HTTP middleware that provides a deterrence // on routes it is applied to, against bots and scrapers. It generates a // unique but deterministic challenge for each HTTP client within an hour // TTL that requires a proof-of-work solution to pass onto the next handler. // On successful solution, the client is provided a cookie that allows them // to bypass this check within that hour TTL. The outcome of this is that it // should make scraping of these endpoints economically unfeasible, when enabled, // and with an absurdly minimal performance impact. The downside is that it // requires javascript to be enabled on the client to pass the middleware check. // // Heavily inspired by: https://github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis func NoLLaMas( cookiePolicy apiutil.CookiePolicy, getInstanceV1 func(context.Context) (*apimodel.InstanceV1, gtserror.WithCode), ) gin.HandlerFunc { if !config.GetAdvancedScraperDeterrence() { // NoLLaMas middleware disabled. return func(*gin.Context) {} } seed := make([]byte, 32) // Read random data for the token seed. _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, seed) if err != nil { panic(err) } // Configure nollamas. var nollamas nollamas nollamas.seed = seed nollamas.ttl = time.Hour nollamas.diff = 4 nollamas.getInstanceV1 = getInstanceV1 nollamas.policy = cookiePolicy return nollamas.Serve } // hashWithBufs encompasses a hash along // with the necessary buffers to generate // a hashsum and then encode that sum. type hashWithBufs struct { hash hash.Hash hbuf []byte ebuf []byte } type nollamas struct { // our instance cookie policy. policy apiutil.CookiePolicy // unique token seed // to prevent hashes // being guessable seed []byte // success cookie TTL ttl time.Duration // algorithm difficulty knobs. // diff determines the number // of leading zeroes required. diff uint8 // extra fields required for // our template rendering. getInstanceV1 func(ctx context.Context) (*apimodel.InstanceV1, gtserror.WithCode) } func (m *nollamas) Serve(c *gin.Context) { if c.Request.Method != http.MethodGet { // Only interested in protecting // crawlable 'GET' endpoints. c.Next() return } // Extract request context. ctx := c.Request.Context() if ctx.Value(oauth.SessionAuthorizedToken) != nil { // Don't guard against requests // providing valid OAuth tokens. c.Next() return } if gtscontext.HTTPSignature(ctx) != "" { // Don't guard against requests // providing HTTP signatures. c.Next() return } // i.e. outputted hash slice length. const hashLen = sha256.Size // i.e. hex.EncodedLen(hashLen). const encodedHashLen = 2 * hashLen // Prepare hash + buffers. hash := hashWithBufs{ hash: sha256.New(), hbuf: make([]byte, 0, hashLen), ebuf: make([]byte, encodedHashLen), } // Extract client fingerprint data. userAgent := c.GetHeader("User-Agent") clientIP := c.ClientIP() // Generate a unique token for this request, // only valid for a period of now +- m.ttl. token := m.token(&hash, userAgent, clientIP) // For unique challenge string just use a // single portion of their 'success' token. // SHA256 is not yet cracked, this is not an // application of a hash requiring serious // cryptographic security and it rotates on // a TTL basis, so it should be fine. challenge := token[:len(token)/4] // Check for a provided success token. cookie, _ := c.Cookie("gts-nollamas") // Check whether passed cookie // is the expected success token. if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare( byteutil.S2B(token), byteutil.S2B(cookie), ) == 1 { // They passed us a valid, expected // token. They already passed checks. c.Next() return } // From here-on out, all // possibilities are handled // by us. Prevent further http // handlers from being called. c.Abort() // Prepare new log entry. l := log.WithContext(ctx). WithField("userAgent", userAgent). WithField("challenge", challenge) // Extract and parse query. query := c.Request.URL.Query() // Check query to see if an in-progress // challenge solution has been provided. nonce := query.Get("nollamas_solution") if nonce == "" || len(nonce) > 20 { // noting that here, 20 is // max integer string len. // // An invalid solution string, just // present them with new challenge. l.Info("posing new challenge") m.renderChallenge(c, challenge) return } // Reset the hash. hash.hash.Reset() // Check challenge+nonce as possible solution. if !m.checkChallenge(&hash, challenge, nonce) { // They failed challenge, // re-present challenge page. l.Info("invalid solution provided") m.renderChallenge(c, challenge) return } l.Infof("challenge passed: %s", nonce) // Drop solution query and encode. query.Del("nollamas_solution") c.Request.URL.RawQuery = query.Encode() // They passed the challenge! Set success token // cookie and allow them to continue to next handlers. m.policy.SetCookie(c, "gts-nollamas", token, int(m.ttl/time.Second), "/") c.Redirect(http.StatusTemporaryRedirect, c.Request.URL.RequestURI()) } func (m *nollamas) renderChallenge(c *gin.Context, challenge string) { // Fetch current instance information for templating vars. instance, errWithCode := m.getInstanceV1(c.Request.Context()) if errWithCode != nil { apiutil.ErrorHandler(c, errWithCode, m.getInstanceV1) return } // Write templated challenge response to client. apiutil.TemplateWebPage(c, apiutil.WebPage{ Template: "nollamas.tmpl", Instance: instance, Stylesheets: []string{ "/assets/dist/nollamas.css", // Include fork-awesome stylesheet // to get nice loading spinner. "/assets/Fork-Awesome/css/fork-awesome.min.css", }, Extra: map[string]any{ "challenge": challenge, "difficulty": m.diff, }, Javascript: []apiutil.JavascriptEntry{ { Src: "/assets/dist/nollamas.js", Defer: true, }, }, }) } func (m *nollamas) token(hash *hashWithBufs, userAgent, clientIP string) string { // Use our unique seed to seed hash, // to ensure we have cryptographically // unique, yet deterministic, tokens // generated for a given http client. hash.hash.Write(m.seed) // Include difficulty level in // hash input data so if config // changes then token invalidates. hash.hash.Write([]byte{m.diff}) // Also seed the generated input with // current time rounded to TTL, so our // single comparison handles expiries. now := time.Now().Round(m.ttl).Unix() hash.hash.Write([]byte{ byte(now >> 56), byte(now >> 48), byte(now >> 40), byte(now >> 32), byte(now >> 24), byte(now >> 16), byte(now >> 8), byte(now), }) // Finally, append unique client request data. hash.hash.Write(byteutil.S2B(userAgent)) hash.hash.Write(byteutil.S2B(clientIP)) // Return hex encoded hash output. hash.hbuf = hash.hash.Sum(hash.hbuf[:0]) hex.Encode(hash.ebuf, hash.hbuf) return string(hash.ebuf) } func (m *nollamas) checkChallenge(hash *hashWithBufs, challenge, nonce string) bool { // Hash and encode input challenge with // proposed nonce as a possible solution. hash.hash.Write(byteutil.S2B(challenge)) hash.hash.Write(byteutil.S2B(nonce)) hash.hbuf = hash.hash.Sum(hash.hbuf[:0]) hex.Encode(hash.ebuf, hash.hbuf) solution := hash.ebuf // Compiler bound-check hint. if len(solution) < int(m.diff) { panic(gtserror.New("BCE")) } // Check that the first 'diff' // many chars are indeed zeroes. for i := range m.diff { if solution[i] != '0' { return false } } return true }