# Description
- tweaks the NoLLaMas proof-of-work algorithm to further granularity on time spent computing solutions
- standardizes GoToSocial cookie security directive setting in a CookiePolicy{} type
## Checklist
- [x] I/we have read the [GoToSocial contribution guidelines](https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/src/branch/main/CONTRIBUTING.md).
- [x] I/we have discussed the proposed changes already, either in an issue on the repository, or in the Matrix chat.
- [x] I/we have not leveraged AI to create the proposed changes.
- [x] I/we have performed a self-review of added code.
- [x] I/we have written code that is legible and maintainable by others.
- [x] I/we have commented the added code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas.
- [ ] I/we have made any necessary changes to documentation.
- [ ] I/we have added tests that cover new code.
- [ ] I/we have run tests and they pass locally with the changes.
- [x] I/we have run `go fmt ./...` and `golangci-lint run`.
Co-authored-by: tobi <tobi.smethurst@protonmail.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/pulls/4090
Co-authored-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com>
This adds a proof-of-work based scraper deterrence to GoToSocial's middleware stack on profile and status web pages. Heavily inspired by https://github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis, but massively stripped back for our own usecase.
Todo:
- ~~add configuration option so this is disabled by default~~
- ~~fix whatever weirdness is preventing this working with CSP (even in debug)~~
- ~~use our standard templating mechanism going through apiutil helper func~~
- ~~probably some absurdly small performance improvements to be made in pooling re-used hex encode / hash encode buffers~~ the web endpoints aren't as hot a path as API / ActivityPub, will leave as-is for now as it is already very minimal and well optimized
- ~~verify the cryptographic assumptions re: using a portion of token as challenge data~~ this isn't a serious application of cryptography, if it turns out to be a problem we'll fix it, but it definitely should not be easily possible to guess a SHA256 hash from the first 1/4 of it even if mathematically it might make it a bit easier
- ~~theme / make look nice??~~
- ~~add a spinner~~
- ~~add entry in example configuration~~
- ~~add documentation~~
Verification page originally based on https://github.com/LucienV1/powtect
Co-authored-by: tobi <tobi.smethurst@protonmail.com>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/superseriousbusiness/gotosocial/pulls/4043
Reviewed-by: tobi <tsmethurst@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: kim <grufwub@gmail.com>
