5684cfebba
impersonation token, which collides with Vista UAC. * cygheap.h (deimpersonate): revert to self instead of impersonating hProcImpToken. (reimpersonate): Only impersonate if setuid. * dcrt0.cc (dll_crt0_0): Don't initialize hProcImpToken here. (dll_crt0_1): Set privileges on hProcToken. * fork.cc (frok::child): Set privileges on hProcToken. Close handle to hProcImpToken. * grp.cc (internal_getgroups): Use hProcToken instead of hProcImpToken. * security.cc (check_access): Create hProcImpToken on demand here. * security.h (set_process_privilege): Set privileges on hProcToken. (_push_thread_privilege): Use hProcToken instead of hProcImpToken. (pop_thread_privilege): If not setuid'ed, revert to self. * syscalls.cc (setegid32): Drop setting primary group on hProcImpToken. Close handle to hProcImpToken. * uinfo.cc (internal_getlogin): Ditto. * winsup.h (clear_procimptoken): New inline function.
2234 lines
66 KiB
C++
2234 lines
66 KiB
C++
/* security.cc: NT security functions
|
|
|
|
Copyright 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
|
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2006 Red Hat, Inc.
|
|
|
|
Originaly written by Gunther Ebert, gunther.ebert@ixos-leipzig.de
|
|
Completely rewritten by Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
|
|
|
|
This file is part of Cygwin.
|
|
|
|
This software is a copyrighted work licensed under the terms of the
|
|
Cygwin license. Please consult the file "CYGWIN_LICENSE" for
|
|
details. */
|
|
|
|
#include "winsup.h"
|
|
#include <grp.h>
|
|
#include <pwd.h>
|
|
#include <unistd.h>
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
#include <limits.h>
|
|
#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
|
#include <sys/acl.h>
|
|
#include <ctype.h>
|
|
#include <winnls.h>
|
|
#include <wingdi.h>
|
|
#include <winuser.h>
|
|
#include <wininet.h>
|
|
#include <ntsecapi.h>
|
|
#include <subauth.h>
|
|
#include <aclapi.h>
|
|
#include <dsgetdc.h>
|
|
#include "cygerrno.h"
|
|
#include "security.h"
|
|
#include "path.h"
|
|
#include "fhandler.h"
|
|
#include "dtable.h"
|
|
#include "pinfo.h"
|
|
#include "cygheap.h"
|
|
#include <ntdef.h>
|
|
#include "ntdll.h"
|
|
#include "lm.h"
|
|
#include "pwdgrp.h"
|
|
#include "cyglsa.h"
|
|
#include <cygwin/version.h>
|
|
|
|
bool allow_ntsec;
|
|
/* allow_smbntsec is handled exclusively in path.cc (path_conv::check).
|
|
It's defined here because of it's strong relationship to allow_ntsec. */
|
|
bool allow_smbntsec;
|
|
bool allow_traverse;
|
|
|
|
extern "C" void
|
|
cygwin_set_impersonation_token (const HANDLE hToken)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("set_impersonation_token (%d)", hToken);
|
|
cygheap->user.external_token = hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ? NO_IMPERSONATION : hToken;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
extract_nt_dom_user (const struct passwd *pw, char *domain, char *user)
|
|
{
|
|
char *d, *u, *c;
|
|
|
|
domain[0] = 0;
|
|
strlcpy (user, pw->pw_name, UNLEN + 1);
|
|
debug_printf ("pw_gecos %x (%s)", pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_gecos);
|
|
|
|
if ((d = strstr (pw->pw_gecos, "U-")) != NULL &&
|
|
(d == pw->pw_gecos || d[-1] == ','))
|
|
{
|
|
c = strechr (d + 2, ',');
|
|
if ((u = strechr (d + 2, '\\')) >= c)
|
|
u = d + 1;
|
|
else if (u - d <= INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 2)
|
|
strlcpy (domain, d + 2, u - d - 1);
|
|
if (c - u <= UNLEN + 1)
|
|
strlcpy (user, u + 1, c - u);
|
|
}
|
|
if (domain[0])
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
cygsid psid;
|
|
DWORD ulen = UNLEN + 1;
|
|
DWORD dlen = INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1;
|
|
SID_NAME_USE use;
|
|
if (psid.getfrompw (pw))
|
|
LookupAccountSid (NULL, psid, user, &ulen, domain, &dlen, &use);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extern "C" HANDLE
|
|
cygwin_logon_user (const struct passwd *pw, const char *password)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wincap.has_security ())
|
|
{
|
|
set_errno (ENOSYS);
|
|
return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pw)
|
|
{
|
|
set_errno (EINVAL);
|
|
return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char nt_domain[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1];
|
|
char nt_user[UNLEN + 1];
|
|
HANDLE hToken;
|
|
|
|
extract_nt_dom_user (pw, nt_domain, nt_user);
|
|
debug_printf ("LogonUserA (%s, %s, %s, ...)", nt_user, nt_domain, password);
|
|
/* CV 2005-06-08: LogonUser should run under the primary process token,
|
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otherwise it returns with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED on W2K. Don't ask me why. */
|
|
RevertToSelf ();
|
|
if (!LogonUserA (nt_user, *nt_domain ? nt_domain : NULL, (char *) password,
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|
LOGON32_LOGON_INTERACTIVE,
|
|
LOGON32_PROVIDER_DEFAULT,
|
|
&hToken))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
hToken = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!SetHandleInformation (hToken,
|
|
HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT,
|
|
HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
CloseHandle (hToken);
|
|
hToken = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
}
|
|
cygheap->user.reimpersonate ();
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debug_printf ("%d = logon_user(%s,...)", hToken, pw->pw_name);
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|
return hToken;
|
|
}
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|
|
static void
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|
str2lsa (LSA_STRING &tgt, const char *srcstr)
|
|
{
|
|
tgt.Length = strlen (srcstr);
|
|
tgt.MaximumLength = tgt.Length + 1;
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|
tgt.Buffer = (PCHAR) srcstr;
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|
}
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|
|
|
static void
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|
str2buf2lsa (LSA_STRING &tgt, char *buf, const char *srcstr)
|
|
{
|
|
tgt.Length = strlen (srcstr);
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|
tgt.MaximumLength = tgt.Length + 1;
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|
tgt.Buffer = (PCHAR) buf;
|
|
memcpy (buf, srcstr, tgt.MaximumLength);
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|
}
|
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|
|
/* The dimension of buf is assumed to be at least strlen(srcstr) + 1,
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The result will be shorter if the input has multibyte chars */
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void
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|
str2buf2uni (UNICODE_STRING &tgt, WCHAR *buf, const char *srcstr)
|
|
{
|
|
tgt.Buffer = (PWCHAR) buf;
|
|
tgt.MaximumLength = (strlen (srcstr) + 1) * sizeof (WCHAR);
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|
tgt.Length = sys_mbstowcs (buf, srcstr, tgt.MaximumLength / sizeof (WCHAR))
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* sizeof (WCHAR);
|
|
if (tgt.Length)
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|
tgt.Length -= sizeof (WCHAR);
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|
}
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|
|
|
void
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|
str2uni_cat (UNICODE_STRING &tgt, const char *srcstr)
|
|
{
|
|
int len = sys_mbstowcs (tgt.Buffer + tgt.Length / sizeof (WCHAR), srcstr,
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|
(tgt.MaximumLength - tgt.Length) / sizeof (WCHAR));
|
|
if (len)
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|
tgt.Length += (len - 1) * sizeof (WCHAR);
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else
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|
tgt.Length = tgt.MaximumLength = 0;
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}
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static LSA_HANDLE
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open_local_policy ()
|
|
{
|
|
LSA_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
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|
LSA_HANDLE lsa = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
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|
NTSTATUS ret = LsaOpenPolicy (NULL, &oa, POLICY_EXECUTE, &lsa);
|
|
if (ret != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (LsaNtStatusToWinError (ret));
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|
return lsa;
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|
}
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|
|
static void
|
|
close_local_policy (LSA_HANDLE &lsa)
|
|
{
|
|
if (lsa != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
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|
LsaClose (lsa);
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|
lsa = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
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|
}
|
|
|
|
/* CV, 2006-07-06: Missing in w32api. */
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|
extern "C" DWORD WINAPI DsGetDcNameA (LPCSTR, LPCSTR, GUID *, LPCSTR, ULONG,
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|
PDOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFOA *);
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|
#define DS_FORCE_REDISCOVERY 1
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|
|
bool
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get_logon_server (const char *domain, char *server, WCHAR *wserver,
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|
bool rediscovery)
|
|
{
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|
DWORD dret;
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PDOMAIN_CONTROLLER_INFOA pci;
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WCHAR *buf;
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DWORD size = INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1;
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|
WCHAR wdomain[size];
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|
|
/* Empty domain is interpreted as local system */
|
|
if ((GetComputerName (server + 2, &size)) &&
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(strcasematch (domain, server + 2) || !domain[0]))
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{
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|
server[0] = server[1] = '\\';
|
|
if (wserver)
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|
sys_mbstowcs (wserver, server, INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1);
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return true;
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}
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|
|
/* Try to get any available domain controller for this domain */
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|
dret = DsGetDcNameA (NULL, domain, NULL, NULL,
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rediscovery ? DS_FORCE_REDISCOVERY : 0, &pci);
|
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if (dret == ERROR_SUCCESS)
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|
{
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|
strcpy (server, pci->DomainControllerName);
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sys_mbstowcs (wserver, server, INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1);
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|
NetApiBufferFree (pci);
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|
debug_printf ("DC: rediscovery: %d, server: %s", rediscovery, server);
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|
return true;
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|
}
|
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else if (dret == ERROR_PROC_NOT_FOUND)
|
|
{
|
|
/* NT4 w/o DSClient */
|
|
sys_mbstowcs (wdomain, domain, INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1);
|
|
if (rediscovery)
|
|
dret = NetGetAnyDCName (NULL, wdomain, (LPBYTE *) &buf);
|
|
else
|
|
dret = NetGetDCName (NULL, wdomain, (LPBYTE *) &buf);
|
|
if (dret == NERR_Success)
|
|
{
|
|
sys_wcstombs (server, INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1, buf);
|
|
if (wserver)
|
|
for (WCHAR *ptr1 = buf; (*wserver++ = *ptr1++);)
|
|
;
|
|
NetApiBufferFree (buf);
|
|
debug_printf ("NT: rediscovery: %d, server: %s", rediscovery, server);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (dret);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
get_user_groups (WCHAR *wlogonserver, cygsidlist &grp_list, char *user,
|
|
char *domain)
|
|
{
|
|
char dgroup[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + GNLEN + 2];
|
|
WCHAR wuser[UNLEN + 1];
|
|
sys_mbstowcs (wuser, user, UNLEN + 1);
|
|
LPGROUP_USERS_INFO_0 buf;
|
|
DWORD cnt, tot, len;
|
|
NET_API_STATUS ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Look only on logonserver */
|
|
ret = NetUserGetGroups (wlogonserver, wuser, 0, (LPBYTE *) &buf,
|
|
MAX_PREFERRED_LENGTH, &cnt, &tot);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (ret);
|
|
/* It's no error when the user name can't be found. */
|
|
return ret == NERR_UserNotFound;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = strlen (domain);
|
|
strcpy (dgroup, domain);
|
|
dgroup[len++] = '\\';
|
|
|
|
for (DWORD i = 0; i < cnt; ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
cygsid gsid;
|
|
DWORD glen = MAX_SID_LEN;
|
|
char domain[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1];
|
|
DWORD dlen = sizeof (domain);
|
|
SID_NAME_USE use = SidTypeInvalid;
|
|
|
|
sys_wcstombs (dgroup + len, GNLEN + 1, buf[i].grui0_name);
|
|
if (!LookupAccountName (NULL, dgroup, gsid, &glen, domain, &dlen, &use))
|
|
debug_printf ("LookupAccountName(%s), %E", dgroup);
|
|
else if (legal_sid_type (use))
|
|
grp_list += gsid;
|
|
else
|
|
debug_printf ("Global group %s invalid. Domain: %s Use: %d",
|
|
dgroup, domain, use);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NetApiBufferFree (buf);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
is_group_member (WCHAR *wgroup, PSID pusersid, cygsidlist &grp_list)
|
|
{
|
|
LPLOCALGROUP_MEMBERS_INFO_1 buf;
|
|
DWORD cnt, tot;
|
|
NET_API_STATUS ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Members can be users or global groups */
|
|
ret = NetLocalGroupGetMembers (NULL, wgroup, 1, (LPBYTE *) &buf,
|
|
MAX_PREFERRED_LENGTH, &cnt, &tot, NULL);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
bool retval = true;
|
|
for (DWORD bidx = 0; bidx < cnt; ++bidx)
|
|
if (EqualSid (pusersid, buf[bidx].lgrmi1_sid))
|
|
goto done;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* The extra test for the group being a global group or a well-known
|
|
group is necessary, since apparently also aliases (for instance
|
|
Administrators or Users) can be members of local groups, even
|
|
though MSDN states otherwise. The GUI refuses to put aliases into
|
|
local groups, but the CLI interface allows it. However, a normal
|
|
logon token does not contain groups, in which the user is only
|
|
indirectly a member by being a member of an alias in this group.
|
|
So we also should not put them into the token group list.
|
|
Note: Allowing those groups in our group list renders external
|
|
tokens invalid, so that it becomes impossible to logon with
|
|
password and valid logon token. */
|
|
for (int glidx = 0; glidx < grp_list.count (); ++glidx)
|
|
if ((buf[bidx].lgrmi1_sidusage == SidTypeGroup
|
|
|| buf[bidx].lgrmi1_sidusage == SidTypeWellKnownGroup)
|
|
&& EqualSid (grp_list.sids[glidx], buf[bidx].lgrmi1_sid))
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = false;
|
|
done:
|
|
NetApiBufferFree (buf);
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
get_user_local_groups (cygsidlist &grp_list, PSID pusersid)
|
|
{
|
|
LPLOCALGROUP_INFO_0 buf;
|
|
DWORD cnt, tot;
|
|
NET_API_STATUS ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = NetLocalGroupEnum (NULL, 0, (LPBYTE *) &buf,
|
|
MAX_PREFERRED_LENGTH, &cnt, &tot, NULL);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (ret);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char bgroup[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + GNLEN + 2];
|
|
char lgroup[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + GNLEN + 2];
|
|
DWORD blen, llen;
|
|
SID_NAME_USE use;
|
|
|
|
blen = llen = INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1;
|
|
if (!LookupAccountSid (NULL, well_known_admins_sid, lgroup, &llen, bgroup, &blen, &use)
|
|
|| !GetComputerNameA (lgroup, &(llen = INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1)))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
bgroup[blen++] = lgroup[llen++] = '\\';
|
|
|
|
for (DWORD i = 0; i < cnt; ++i)
|
|
if (is_group_member (buf[i].lgrpi0_name, pusersid, grp_list))
|
|
{
|
|
cygsid gsid;
|
|
DWORD glen = MAX_SID_LEN;
|
|
char domain[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1];
|
|
DWORD dlen = sizeof (domain);
|
|
|
|
use = SidTypeInvalid;
|
|
sys_wcstombs (bgroup + blen, GNLEN + 1, buf[i].lgrpi0_name);
|
|
if (!LookupAccountName (NULL, bgroup, gsid, &glen, domain, &dlen, &use))
|
|
{
|
|
if (GetLastError () != ERROR_NONE_MAPPED)
|
|
debug_printf ("LookupAccountName(%s), %E", bgroup);
|
|
strcpy (lgroup + llen, bgroup + blen);
|
|
if (!LookupAccountName (NULL, lgroup, gsid, &glen,
|
|
domain, &dlen, &use))
|
|
debug_printf ("LookupAccountName(%s), %E", lgroup);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!legal_sid_type (use))
|
|
debug_printf ("Rejecting local %s. use: %d", bgroup + blen, use);
|
|
grp_list *= gsid;
|
|
}
|
|
NetApiBufferFree (buf);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
sid_in_token_groups (PTOKEN_GROUPS grps, cygpsid sid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!grps)
|
|
return false;
|
|
for (DWORD i = 0; i < grps->GroupCount; ++i)
|
|
if (sid == grps->Groups[i].Sid)
|
|
return true;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if 0 /* Unused */
|
|
static BOOL
|
|
get_user_primary_group (WCHAR *wlogonserver, const char *user,
|
|
PSID pusersid, cygsid &pgrpsid)
|
|
{
|
|
LPUSER_INFO_3 buf;
|
|
WCHAR wuser[UNLEN + 1];
|
|
NET_API_STATUS ret;
|
|
BOOL retval = FALSE;
|
|
UCHAR count = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (well_known_system_sid == pusersid)
|
|
{
|
|
pgrpsid = well_known_system_sid;
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sys_mbstowcs (wuser, user, UNLEN + 1);
|
|
ret = NetUserGetInfo (wlogonserver, wuser, 3, (LPBYTE *) &buf);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (ret);
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pgrpsid = pusersid;
|
|
if (IsValidSid (pgrpsid)
|
|
&& (count = *GetSidSubAuthorityCount (pgrpsid)) > 1)
|
|
{
|
|
*GetSidSubAuthority (pgrpsid, count - 1) = buf->usri3_primary_group_id;
|
|
retval = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
NetApiBufferFree (buf);
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
get_unix_group_sidlist (struct passwd *pw, cygsidlist &grp_list)
|
|
{
|
|
struct __group32 *gr;
|
|
cygsid gsid;
|
|
|
|
for (int gidx = 0; (gr = internal_getgrent (gidx)); ++gidx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (gr->gr_gid == (__gid32_t) pw->pw_gid)
|
|
goto found;
|
|
else if (gr->gr_mem)
|
|
for (int gi = 0; gr->gr_mem[gi]; ++gi)
|
|
if (strcasematch (pw->pw_name, gr->gr_mem[gi]))
|
|
goto found;
|
|
continue;
|
|
found:
|
|
if (gsid.getfromgr (gr))
|
|
grp_list += gsid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
get_token_group_sidlist (cygsidlist &grp_list, PTOKEN_GROUPS my_grps,
|
|
LUID auth_luid, int &auth_pos)
|
|
{
|
|
auth_pos = -1;
|
|
if (my_grps)
|
|
{
|
|
/* In Vista the Local SID is missing in a token constructed by
|
|
subauthentication. We add the group unconditionally now. */
|
|
/*if (sid_in_token_groups (my_grps, well_known_local_sid))*/
|
|
grp_list += well_known_local_sid;
|
|
if (sid_in_token_groups (my_grps, well_known_dialup_sid))
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_dialup_sid;
|
|
if (sid_in_token_groups (my_grps, well_known_network_sid))
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_network_sid;
|
|
if (sid_in_token_groups (my_grps, well_known_batch_sid))
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_batch_sid;
|
|
/* This is a problem on 2K3 (only domain controllers?!?) which only
|
|
enables tools for selected special groups. A subauth token is
|
|
only NETWORK, but NETWORK has no access to these tools. Therefore
|
|
we always add INTERACTIVE here. */
|
|
/*if (sid_in_token_groups (my_grps, well_known_interactive_sid))*/
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_interactive_sid;
|
|
if (sid_in_token_groups (my_grps, well_known_service_sid))
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_service_sid;
|
|
if (sid_in_token_groups (my_grps, well_known_this_org_sid))
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_this_org_sid;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
grp_list += well_known_local_sid;
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_interactive_sid;
|
|
}
|
|
if (get_ll (auth_luid) != 999LL) /* != SYSTEM_LUID */
|
|
{
|
|
for (DWORD i = 0; i < my_grps->GroupCount; ++i)
|
|
if (my_grps->Groups[i].Attributes & SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID)
|
|
{
|
|
grp_list += my_grps->Groups[i].Sid;
|
|
auth_pos = grp_list.count () - 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
get_server_groups (cygsidlist &grp_list, PSID usersid, struct passwd *pw)
|
|
{
|
|
char user[UNLEN + 1];
|
|
char domain[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1];
|
|
WCHAR wserver[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 3];
|
|
char server[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 3];
|
|
|
|
if (well_known_system_sid == usersid)
|
|
{
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_admins_sid;
|
|
get_unix_group_sidlist (pw, grp_list);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_world_sid;
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_authenticated_users_sid;
|
|
extract_nt_dom_user (pw, domain, user);
|
|
if (get_logon_server (domain, server, wserver, false)
|
|
&& !get_user_groups (wserver, grp_list, user, domain)
|
|
&& get_logon_server (domain, server, wserver, true))
|
|
get_user_groups (wserver, grp_list, user, domain);
|
|
if (get_user_local_groups (grp_list, usersid))
|
|
{
|
|
get_unix_group_sidlist (pw, grp_list);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
get_initgroups_sidlist (cygsidlist &grp_list,
|
|
PSID usersid, PSID pgrpsid, struct passwd *pw,
|
|
PTOKEN_GROUPS my_grps, LUID auth_luid, int &auth_pos)
|
|
{
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_world_sid;
|
|
grp_list *= well_known_authenticated_users_sid;
|
|
if (well_known_system_sid == usersid)
|
|
auth_pos = -1;
|
|
else
|
|
get_token_group_sidlist (grp_list, my_grps, auth_luid, auth_pos);
|
|
if (!get_server_groups (grp_list, usersid, pw))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/* special_pgrp true if pgrpsid is not in normal groups */
|
|
grp_list += pgrpsid;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
get_setgroups_sidlist (cygsidlist &tmp_list, PSID usersid, struct passwd *pw,
|
|
PTOKEN_GROUPS my_grps, user_groups &groups,
|
|
LUID auth_luid, int &auth_pos)
|
|
{
|
|
tmp_list *= well_known_world_sid;
|
|
tmp_list *= well_known_authenticated_users_sid;
|
|
get_token_group_sidlist (tmp_list, my_grps, auth_luid, auth_pos);
|
|
get_server_groups (tmp_list, usersid, pw);
|
|
for (int gidx = 0; gidx < groups.sgsids.count (); gidx++)
|
|
tmp_list += groups.sgsids.sids[gidx];
|
|
tmp_list += groups.pgsid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const cygpriv_idx sys_privs[] = {
|
|
SE_TCB_PRIV,
|
|
SE_ASSIGNPRIMARYTOKEN_PRIV,
|
|
SE_CREATE_TOKEN_PRIV,
|
|
SE_CHANGE_NOTIFY_PRIV,
|
|
SE_SECURITY_PRIV,
|
|
SE_BACKUP_PRIV,
|
|
SE_RESTORE_PRIV,
|
|
SE_SYSTEMTIME_PRIV,
|
|
SE_SHUTDOWN_PRIV,
|
|
SE_REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_PRIV,
|
|
SE_TAKE_OWNERSHIP_PRIV,
|
|
SE_DEBUG_PRIV,
|
|
SE_SYSTEM_ENVIRONMENT_PRIV,
|
|
SE_SYSTEM_PROFILE_PRIV,
|
|
SE_PROF_SINGLE_PROCESS_PRIV,
|
|
SE_INC_BASE_PRIORITY_PRIV,
|
|
SE_LOAD_DRIVER_PRIV,
|
|
SE_CREATE_PAGEFILE_PRIV,
|
|
SE_INCREASE_QUOTA_PRIV,
|
|
SE_LOCK_MEMORY_PRIV,
|
|
SE_CREATE_PERMANENT_PRIV,
|
|
SE_AUDIT_PRIV,
|
|
SE_UNDOCK_PRIV,
|
|
SE_MANAGE_VOLUME_PRIV,
|
|
SE_IMPERSONATE_PRIV,
|
|
SE_CREATE_GLOBAL_PRIV,
|
|
SE_INCREASE_WORKING_SET_PRIV,
|
|
SE_TIME_ZONE_PRIV,
|
|
SE_CREATE_SYMBOLIC_LINK_PRIV
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define SYSTEM_PRIVILEGES_COUNT (sizeof sys_privs / sizeof *sys_privs)
|
|
|
|
static PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES
|
|
get_system_priv_list (cygsidlist &grp_list, size_t &size)
|
|
{
|
|
const LUID *priv;
|
|
size = sizeof (ULONG)
|
|
+ SYSTEM_PRIVILEGES_COUNT * sizeof (LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES);
|
|
PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES privs = (PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES) malloc (size);
|
|
if (!privs)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("malloc (system_privs) failed.");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
privs->PrivilegeCount = 0;
|
|
|
|
for (DWORD i = 0; i < SYSTEM_PRIVILEGES_COUNT; ++i)
|
|
if ((priv = privilege_luid (sys_privs[i])))
|
|
{
|
|
privs->Privileges[privs->PrivilegeCount].Luid = *priv;
|
|
privs->Privileges[privs->PrivilegeCount].Attributes =
|
|
SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT;
|
|
++privs->PrivilegeCount;
|
|
}
|
|
return privs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES
|
|
get_priv_list (LSA_HANDLE lsa, cygsid &usersid, cygsidlist &grp_list,
|
|
size_t &size)
|
|
{
|
|
PLSA_UNICODE_STRING privstrs;
|
|
ULONG cnt;
|
|
PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES privs = NULL;
|
|
NTSTATUS ret;
|
|
char buf[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1];
|
|
|
|
if (usersid == well_known_system_sid)
|
|
return get_system_priv_list (grp_list, size);
|
|
|
|
for (int grp = -1; grp < grp_list.count (); ++grp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (grp == -1)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((ret = LsaEnumerateAccountRights (lsa, usersid, &privstrs,
|
|
&cnt)) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
else if ((ret = LsaEnumerateAccountRights (lsa, grp_list.sids[grp],
|
|
&privstrs, &cnt))
|
|
!= STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
continue;
|
|
for (ULONG i = 0; i < cnt; ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
const LUID *priv;
|
|
PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES tmp;
|
|
DWORD tmp_count;
|
|
|
|
sys_wcstombs (buf, sizeof (buf),
|
|
privstrs[i].Buffer, privstrs[i].Length / 2);
|
|
if (!(priv = privilege_luid_by_name (buf)))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (privs)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD pcnt = privs->PrivilegeCount;
|
|
LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES *p = privs->Privileges;
|
|
for (; pcnt > 0; --pcnt, ++p)
|
|
if (priv->HighPart == p->Luid.HighPart
|
|
&& priv->LowPart == p->Luid.LowPart)
|
|
goto next_account_right;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tmp_count = privs ? privs->PrivilegeCount : 0;
|
|
size = sizeof (DWORD)
|
|
+ (tmp_count + 1) * sizeof (LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES);
|
|
tmp = (PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES) realloc (privs, size);
|
|
if (!tmp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (privs)
|
|
free (privs);
|
|
LsaFreeMemory (privstrs);
|
|
debug_printf ("realloc (privs) failed.");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
tmp->PrivilegeCount = tmp_count;
|
|
privs = tmp;
|
|
privs->Privileges[privs->PrivilegeCount].Luid = *priv;
|
|
privs->Privileges[privs->PrivilegeCount].Attributes =
|
|
SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED | SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT;
|
|
++privs->PrivilegeCount;
|
|
|
|
next_account_right:
|
|
;
|
|
}
|
|
LsaFreeMemory (privstrs);
|
|
}
|
|
return privs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Accept a token if
|
|
- the requested usersid matches the TokenUser and
|
|
- if setgroups has been called:
|
|
the token groups that are listed in /etc/group match the union of
|
|
the requested primary and supplementary groups in gsids.
|
|
- else the (unknown) implicitly requested supplementary groups and those
|
|
in the token are the groups associated with the usersid. We assume
|
|
they match and verify only the primary groups.
|
|
The requested primary group must appear in the token.
|
|
The primary group in the token is a group associated with the usersid,
|
|
except if the token is internal and the group is in the token SD
|
|
(see create_token). In that latter case that group must match the
|
|
requested primary group. */
|
|
bool
|
|
verify_token (HANDLE token, cygsid &usersid, user_groups &groups, bool *pintern)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
bool intern = false;
|
|
|
|
if (pintern)
|
|
{
|
|
TOKEN_SOURCE ts;
|
|
if (!GetTokenInformation (token, TokenSource,
|
|
&ts, sizeof ts, &size))
|
|
debug_printf ("GetTokenInformation(), %E");
|
|
else
|
|
*pintern = intern = !memcmp (ts.SourceName, "Cygwin.1", 8);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Verify usersid */
|
|
cygsid tok_usersid = NO_SID;
|
|
if (!GetTokenInformation (token, TokenUser,
|
|
&tok_usersid, sizeof tok_usersid, &size))
|
|
debug_printf ("GetTokenInformation(), %E");
|
|
if (usersid != tok_usersid)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/* For an internal token, if setgroups was not called and if the sd group
|
|
is not well_known_null_sid, it must match pgrpsid */
|
|
if (intern && !groups.issetgroups ())
|
|
{
|
|
const DWORD sd_buf_siz = MAX_SID_LEN + sizeof (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR);
|
|
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd_buf = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) alloca (sd_buf_siz);
|
|
cygpsid gsid (NO_SID);
|
|
if (!GetKernelObjectSecurity (token, GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
|
|
sd_buf, sd_buf_siz, &size))
|
|
debug_printf ("GetKernelObjectSecurity(), %E");
|
|
else if (!GetSecurityDescriptorGroup (sd_buf, (PSID *) &gsid,
|
|
(BOOL *) &size))
|
|
debug_printf ("GetSecurityDescriptorGroup(), %E");
|
|
if (well_known_null_sid != gsid)
|
|
return gsid == groups.pgsid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PTOKEN_GROUPS my_grps;
|
|
bool sawpg = false, ret = false;
|
|
|
|
if (!GetTokenInformation (token, TokenGroups, NULL, 0, &size) &&
|
|
GetLastError () != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
|
|
debug_printf ("GetTokenInformation(token, TokenGroups), %E");
|
|
else if (!(my_grps = (PTOKEN_GROUPS) alloca (size)))
|
|
debug_printf ("alloca (my_grps) failed.");
|
|
else if (!GetTokenInformation (token, TokenGroups, my_grps, size, &size))
|
|
debug_printf ("GetTokenInformation(my_token, TokenGroups), %E");
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (groups.issetgroups ()) /* setgroups was called */
|
|
{
|
|
cygsid gsid;
|
|
struct __group32 *gr;
|
|
bool saw[groups.sgsids.count ()];
|
|
memset (saw, 0, sizeof(saw));
|
|
|
|
/* token groups found in /etc/group match the user.gsids ? */
|
|
for (int gidx = 0; (gr = internal_getgrent (gidx)); ++gidx)
|
|
if (gsid.getfromgr (gr) && sid_in_token_groups (my_grps, gsid))
|
|
{
|
|
int pos = groups.sgsids.position (gsid);
|
|
if (pos >= 0)
|
|
saw[pos] = true;
|
|
else if (groups.pgsid == gsid)
|
|
sawpg = true;
|
|
else if (gsid != well_known_world_sid
|
|
&& gsid != usersid)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
/* user.sgsids groups must be in the token */
|
|
for (int gidx = 0; gidx < groups.sgsids.count (); gidx++)
|
|
if (!saw[gidx] && !sid_in_token_groups (my_grps, groups.sgsids.sids[gidx]))
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
/* The primary group must be in the token */
|
|
ret = sawpg
|
|
|| sid_in_token_groups (my_grps, groups.pgsid)
|
|
|| groups.pgsid == usersid;
|
|
}
|
|
done:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
HANDLE
|
|
create_token (cygsid &usersid, user_groups &new_groups, struct passwd *pw,
|
|
HANDLE subauth_token)
|
|
{
|
|
NTSTATUS ret;
|
|
LSA_HANDLE lsa = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
|
|
cygsidlist tmp_gsids (cygsidlist_auto, 12);
|
|
|
|
SECURITY_QUALITY_OF_SERVICE sqos =
|
|
{ sizeof sqos, SecurityImpersonation, SECURITY_STATIC_TRACKING, FALSE };
|
|
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa = { sizeof oa, 0, 0, 0, 0, &sqos };
|
|
LUID auth_luid = SYSTEM_LUID;
|
|
LARGE_INTEGER exp = { QuadPart:INT64_MAX };
|
|
|
|
TOKEN_USER user;
|
|
PTOKEN_GROUPS new_tok_gsids = NULL;
|
|
PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES privs = NULL;
|
|
TOKEN_OWNER owner;
|
|
TOKEN_PRIMARY_GROUP pgrp;
|
|
TOKEN_DEFAULT_DACL dacl = {};
|
|
TOKEN_SOURCE source;
|
|
TOKEN_STATISTICS stats;
|
|
memcpy (source.SourceName, "Cygwin.1", 8);
|
|
source.SourceIdentifier.HighPart = 0;
|
|
source.SourceIdentifier.LowPart = (subauth_token ? 0x0102 : 0x0101);
|
|
|
|
HANDLE token = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
HANDLE primary_token = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
|
|
PTOKEN_GROUPS my_tok_gsids = NULL;
|
|
DWORD size;
|
|
size_t psize = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* SE_CREATE_TOKEN_NAME privilege needed to call NtCreateToken. */
|
|
push_self_privilege (SE_CREATE_TOKEN_PRIV, true);
|
|
|
|
/* Open policy object. */
|
|
if ((lsa = open_local_policy ()) == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* User, owner, primary group. */
|
|
user.User.Sid = usersid;
|
|
user.User.Attributes = 0;
|
|
owner.Owner = usersid;
|
|
|
|
/* Retrieve authentication id and group list from own process. */
|
|
HANDLE get_token;
|
|
if (subauth_token)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("get_token = subauth_token");
|
|
get_token = subauth_token;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("get_token = hProcToken");
|
|
get_token = hProcToken;
|
|
}
|
|
if (get_token)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Switching user context to SYSTEM doesn't inherit the authentication
|
|
id of the user account running current process. */
|
|
if (usersid != well_known_system_sid)
|
|
if (!GetTokenInformation (get_token, TokenStatistics,
|
|
&stats, sizeof stats, &size))
|
|
debug_printf
|
|
("GetTokenInformation(get_token, TokenStatistics), %E");
|
|
else
|
|
auth_luid = stats.AuthenticationId;
|
|
|
|
/* Retrieving current processes group list to be able to inherit
|
|
some important well known group sids. */
|
|
if (!GetTokenInformation (get_token, TokenGroups, NULL, 0, &size)
|
|
&& GetLastError () != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
|
|
debug_printf ("GetTokenInformation(get_token, TokenGroups), %E");
|
|
else if (!(my_tok_gsids = (PTOKEN_GROUPS) malloc (size)))
|
|
debug_printf ("malloc (my_tok_gsids) failed.");
|
|
else if (!GetTokenInformation (get_token, TokenGroups, my_tok_gsids,
|
|
size, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("GetTokenInformation(get_token, TokenGroups), %E");
|
|
free (my_tok_gsids);
|
|
my_tok_gsids = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (subauth_token)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!GetTokenInformation (subauth_token, TokenPrivileges, NULL, 0, &size)
|
|
&& GetLastError () != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
|
|
debug_printf ("GetTokenInformation(subauth_token, TokenPrivileges), %E");
|
|
else if (!(privs = (PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES) malloc (size)))
|
|
debug_printf ("malloc (privs) failed.");
|
|
else if (!GetTokenInformation (subauth_token, TokenPrivileges, privs,
|
|
size, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("GetTokenInformation(subauth_token, TokenPrivileges), %E");
|
|
free (privs);
|
|
privs = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Create list of groups, the user is member in. */
|
|
int auth_pos;
|
|
if (new_groups.issetgroups ())
|
|
get_setgroups_sidlist (tmp_gsids, usersid, pw, my_tok_gsids, new_groups,
|
|
auth_luid, auth_pos);
|
|
else if (!get_initgroups_sidlist (tmp_gsids, usersid, new_groups.pgsid, pw,
|
|
my_tok_gsids, auth_luid, auth_pos))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Primary group. */
|
|
pgrp.PrimaryGroup = new_groups.pgsid;
|
|
|
|
/* Create a TOKEN_GROUPS list from the above retrieved list of sids. */
|
|
new_tok_gsids = (PTOKEN_GROUPS)
|
|
alloca (sizeof (DWORD) + tmp_gsids.count ()
|
|
* sizeof (SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES));
|
|
new_tok_gsids->GroupCount = tmp_gsids.count ();
|
|
for (DWORD i = 0; i < new_tok_gsids->GroupCount; ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
new_tok_gsids->Groups[i].Sid = tmp_gsids.sids[i];
|
|
new_tok_gsids->Groups[i].Attributes = SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
|
|
| SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
|
|
| SE_GROUP_ENABLED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (auth_pos >= 0)
|
|
new_tok_gsids->Groups[auth_pos].Attributes |= SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID;
|
|
/* Retrieve list of privileges of that user. */
|
|
if (!privs && !(privs = get_priv_list (lsa, usersid, tmp_gsids, psize)))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Let's be heroic... */
|
|
ret = NtCreateToken (&token, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, &oa, TokenImpersonation,
|
|
&auth_luid, &exp, &user, new_tok_gsids, privs, &owner,
|
|
&pgrp, &dacl, &source);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
__seterrno_from_nt_status (ret);
|
|
else if (GetLastError () == ERROR_PROC_NOT_FOUND)
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
debug_printf ("Loading NtCreateToken failed.");
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Convert to primary token. */
|
|
if (!DuplicateTokenEx (token, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, &sec_none,
|
|
SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary,
|
|
&primary_token))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
debug_printf ("DuplicateTokenEx %E");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
pop_self_privilege ();
|
|
if (token != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
|
|
CloseHandle (token);
|
|
if (privs)
|
|
free (privs);
|
|
if (my_tok_gsids)
|
|
free (my_tok_gsids);
|
|
close_local_policy (lsa);
|
|
|
|
debug_printf ("0x%x = create_token ()", primary_token);
|
|
return primary_token;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Subauthentication gets useless now that real LSA authentication is
|
|
available. The accompanying code in seteuid32 and environ.cc is
|
|
also disabled.
|
|
TODO: Deprecate and delete code entirely.
|
|
TODO: Delete from documentation. */
|
|
#if 0
|
|
extern "C"
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL WINAPI Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection (PVOID *);
|
|
BOOL WINAPI Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection (PVOID);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static enum
|
|
{
|
|
not_tested,
|
|
not_installed,
|
|
installed
|
|
} cygsuba_installed __attribute__((section (".cygwin_dll_common"), shared))
|
|
= not_tested;
|
|
|
|
int subauth_id = 255;
|
|
|
|
HANDLE
|
|
subauth (struct passwd *pw)
|
|
{
|
|
LSA_STRING name;
|
|
HANDLE lsa_hdl = NULL;
|
|
LSA_OPERATIONAL_MODE sec_mode;
|
|
NTSTATUS ret, ret2;
|
|
ULONG package_id, size;
|
|
struct {
|
|
LSA_STRING str;
|
|
CHAR buf[16];
|
|
} origin;
|
|
struct {
|
|
MSV1_0_LM20_LOGON auth;
|
|
WCHAR dombuf[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1];
|
|
WCHAR usrbuf[UNLEN + 1];
|
|
WCHAR wkstbuf[1];
|
|
CHAR authinf1[1];
|
|
CHAR authinf2[1];
|
|
} subbuf;
|
|
TOKEN_SOURCE ts;
|
|
PMSV1_0_LM20_LOGON_PROFILE profile;
|
|
LUID luid;
|
|
QUOTA_LIMITS quota;
|
|
char nt_domain[INTERNET_MAX_HOST_NAME_LENGTH + 1];
|
|
char nt_user[UNLEN + 1];
|
|
/* Changed from INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE to NULL. A failed LsaLogonUser
|
|
sets the token to NULL anyway, so starting with NULL simplifies
|
|
the below test before calling CloseHandle. */
|
|
HANDLE user_token = NULL;
|
|
HANDLE primary_token = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if cygsuba.dll has been registered and is present. The
|
|
idea here is to avoid authentication failure messages in the security
|
|
event log for each logon attempt if cygsuba.dll hasn't been installed.
|
|
The test is only made once per DLL life time, since installing and
|
|
registering the subauthentication DLL requires reboot anyway. */
|
|
if (cygsuba_installed == not_installed)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("subauth not installed, exit subauth");
|
|
return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (cygsuba_installed == not_tested)
|
|
{
|
|
char auth_path[CYG_MAX_PATH];
|
|
|
|
cygsuba_installed = not_installed;
|
|
__small_sprintf (auth_path, "/proc/registry/HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SYSTEM/"
|
|
"CurrentControlSet/Control/Lsa/MSV1_0/Auth%d",
|
|
subauth_id);
|
|
if (access (auth_path, F_OK))
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("%s doesn't exist, exit subauth", auth_path);
|
|
return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* On 64 bit systems the dll must be installed into the *real* system32
|
|
directory so we have to switch off file system redirection. */
|
|
PVOID old_fsredir;
|
|
DWORD attr = INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES;
|
|
Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection (&old_fsredir);
|
|
if (GetSystemDirectory (auth_path, CYG_MAX_PATH))
|
|
{
|
|
strcat (auth_path, "\\cygsuba.dll");
|
|
attr = GetFileAttributes (auth_path);
|
|
}
|
|
Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection (old_fsredir);
|
|
if (attr == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("%s doesn't exist, exit subauth", auth_path);
|
|
return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
|
}
|
|
cygsuba_installed = installed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
push_self_privilege (SE_TCB_PRIV, true);
|
|
|
|
/* Register as logon process. */
|
|
str2lsa (name, "Cygwin");
|
|
SetLastError (0);
|
|
ret = LsaRegisterLogonProcess (&name, &lsa_hdl, &sec_mode);
|
|
if (ret != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("LsaRegisterLogonProcess: %d", ret);
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (LsaNtStatusToWinError (ret));
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (GetLastError () == ERROR_PROC_NOT_FOUND)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("Couldn't load Secur32.dll");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Get handle to MSV1_0 package. */
|
|
str2lsa (name, MSV1_0_PACKAGE_NAME);
|
|
ret = LsaLookupAuthenticationPackage (lsa_hdl, &name, &package_id);
|
|
if (ret != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("LsaLookupAuthenticationPackage: %d", ret);
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (LsaNtStatusToWinError (ret));
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Create origin. */
|
|
str2buf2lsa (origin.str, origin.buf, "Cygwin");
|
|
/* Create token source. */
|
|
memcpy (ts.SourceName, "Cygwin.1", 8);
|
|
ts.SourceIdentifier.HighPart = 0;
|
|
ts.SourceIdentifier.LowPart = 0x0100;
|
|
/* Get user information. */
|
|
extract_nt_dom_user (pw, nt_domain, nt_user);
|
|
/* Fill subauth with values. */
|
|
subbuf.auth.MessageType = MsV1_0NetworkLogon;
|
|
str2buf2uni (subbuf.auth.LogonDomainName, subbuf.dombuf, nt_domain);
|
|
str2buf2uni (subbuf.auth.UserName, subbuf.usrbuf, nt_user);
|
|
str2buf2uni (subbuf.auth.Workstation, subbuf.wkstbuf, "");
|
|
memcpy (subbuf.auth.ChallengeToClient, "12345678", MSV1_0_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
|
|
str2buf2lsa (subbuf.auth.CaseSensitiveChallengeResponse, subbuf.authinf1, "");
|
|
str2buf2lsa (subbuf.auth.CaseInsensitiveChallengeResponse,subbuf.authinf2,"");
|
|
subbuf.auth.ParameterControl = 0 | (subauth_id << 24);
|
|
/* Try to logon... */
|
|
ret = LsaLogonUser (lsa_hdl, (PLSA_STRING) &origin, Network,
|
|
package_id, &subbuf, sizeof subbuf,
|
|
NULL, &ts, (PVOID *) &profile, &size,
|
|
&luid, &user_token, "a, &ret2);
|
|
if (ret != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("LsaLogonUser: %d", ret);
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (LsaNtStatusToWinError (ret));
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
LsaFreeReturnBuffer (profile);
|
|
/* Convert to primary token. */
|
|
if (!DuplicateTokenEx (user_token, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, &sec_none,
|
|
SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, &primary_token))
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (lsa_hdl)
|
|
LsaDeregisterLogonProcess (lsa_hdl);
|
|
pop_self_privilege ();
|
|
if (user_token)
|
|
CloseHandle (user_token);
|
|
return primary_token;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
HANDLE
|
|
lsaauth (cygsid &usersid, user_groups &new_groups, struct passwd *pw)
|
|
{
|
|
cygsidlist tmp_gsids (cygsidlist_auto, 12);
|
|
cygpsid pgrpsid;
|
|
LSA_STRING name;
|
|
HANDLE lsa_hdl = NULL, lsa;
|
|
LSA_OPERATIONAL_MODE sec_mode;
|
|
NTSTATUS ret, ret2;
|
|
ULONG package_id, size;
|
|
LUID auth_luid = SYSTEM_LUID;
|
|
struct {
|
|
LSA_STRING str;
|
|
CHAR buf[16];
|
|
} origin;
|
|
cyglsa_t *authinf = NULL;
|
|
ULONG authinf_size;
|
|
TOKEN_SOURCE ts;
|
|
PCYG_TOKEN_GROUPS gsids = NULL;
|
|
PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES privs = NULL;
|
|
PACL dacl = NULL;
|
|
PVOID profile = NULL;
|
|
LUID luid;
|
|
QUOTA_LIMITS quota;
|
|
size_t psize = 0, gsize = 0, dsize = 0;
|
|
OFFSET offset, sids_offset;
|
|
int tmpidx, non_well_known_cnt;
|
|
|
|
HANDLE user_token = NULL;
|
|
|
|
push_self_privilege (SE_TCB_PRIV, true);
|
|
|
|
/* Register as logon process. */
|
|
str2lsa (name, "Cygwin");
|
|
SetLastError (0);
|
|
ret = LsaRegisterLogonProcess (&name, &lsa_hdl, &sec_mode);
|
|
if (ret != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("LsaRegisterLogonProcess: %p", ret);
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (LsaNtStatusToWinError (ret));
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (GetLastError () == ERROR_PROC_NOT_FOUND)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("Couldn't load Secur32.dll");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Get handle to our own LSA package. */
|
|
str2lsa (name, CYG_LSA_PKGNAME);
|
|
ret = LsaLookupAuthenticationPackage (lsa_hdl, &name, &package_id);
|
|
if (ret != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("LsaLookupAuthenticationPackage: %p", ret);
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (LsaNtStatusToWinError (ret));
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Open policy object. */
|
|
if ((lsa = open_local_policy ()) == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Create origin. */
|
|
str2buf2lsa (origin.str, origin.buf, "Cygwin");
|
|
/* Create token source. */
|
|
memcpy (ts.SourceName, "Cygwin.1", 8);
|
|
ts.SourceIdentifier.HighPart = 0;
|
|
ts.SourceIdentifier.LowPart = 0x0103;
|
|
|
|
/* Create list of groups, the user is member in. */
|
|
int auth_pos;
|
|
if (new_groups.issetgroups ())
|
|
get_setgroups_sidlist (tmp_gsids, usersid, pw, NULL, new_groups, auth_luid,
|
|
auth_pos);
|
|
else if (!get_initgroups_sidlist (tmp_gsids, usersid, new_groups.pgsid, pw,
|
|
NULL, auth_luid, auth_pos))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
/* The logon SID entry is not generated automatically on Windows 2000
|
|
and earlier for some reason. So add fake logon sid here, which is
|
|
filled with logon id values in the authentication package. */
|
|
if (wincap.needs_logon_sid_in_sid_list ())
|
|
tmp_gsids += fake_logon_sid;
|
|
|
|
tmp_gsids.debug_print ("tmp_gsids");
|
|
|
|
/* Evaluate size of TOKEN_GROUPS list */
|
|
non_well_known_cnt = tmp_gsids.non_well_known_count ();
|
|
gsize = sizeof (DWORD) + non_well_known_cnt * sizeof (SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES);
|
|
tmpidx = -1;
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < non_well_known_cnt; ++i)
|
|
if ((tmpidx = tmp_gsids.next_non_well_known_sid (tmpidx)) >= 0)
|
|
gsize += GetLengthSid (tmp_gsids.sids[tmpidx]);
|
|
|
|
/* Retrieve list of privileges of that user. */
|
|
if (!(privs = get_priv_list (lsa, usersid, tmp_gsids, psize)))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Create DefaultDacl. */
|
|
dsize = sizeof (ACL) + 3 * sizeof (ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE)
|
|
+ GetLengthSid (usersid)
|
|
+ GetLengthSid (well_known_admins_sid)
|
|
+ GetLengthSid (well_known_system_sid);
|
|
dacl = (PACL) alloca (dsize);
|
|
if (!InitializeAcl (dacl, dsize, ACL_REVISION))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (!AddAccessAllowedAce (dacl, ACL_REVISION, GENERIC_ALL, usersid))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (!AddAccessAllowedAce (dacl, ACL_REVISION, GENERIC_ALL,
|
|
well_known_admins_sid))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (!AddAccessAllowedAce (dacl, ACL_REVISION, GENERIC_ALL,
|
|
well_known_system_sid))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Evaluate authinf size and allocate authinf. */
|
|
authinf_size = (authinf->data - (PBYTE) authinf);
|
|
authinf_size += GetLengthSid (usersid); /* User SID */
|
|
authinf_size += gsize; /* Groups + Group SIDs */
|
|
/* When trying to define the admins group as primary group on Vista,
|
|
LsaLogonUser fails with error STATUS_INVALID_OWNER. As workaround
|
|
we define "Local" as primary group here. First, this adds the otherwise
|
|
missing "Local" group to the group list and second, seteuid32
|
|
sets the primary group to the group set in /etc/passwd anyway. */
|
|
pgrpsid = well_known_local_sid;
|
|
authinf_size += GetLengthSid (pgrpsid); /* Primary Group SID */
|
|
|
|
authinf_size += psize; /* Privileges */
|
|
authinf_size += 0; /* Owner SID */
|
|
authinf_size += dsize; /* Default DACL */
|
|
|
|
authinf = (cyglsa_t *) alloca (authinf_size);
|
|
authinf->inf_size = authinf_size - ((PBYTE) &authinf->inf - (PBYTE) authinf);
|
|
|
|
authinf->magic = CYG_LSA_MAGIC;
|
|
|
|
extract_nt_dom_user (pw, authinf->domain, authinf->username);
|
|
|
|
/* Store stuff in authinf with offset relative to start of "inf" member,
|
|
instead of using pointers. */
|
|
offset = authinf->data - (PBYTE) &authinf->inf;
|
|
|
|
authinf->inf.ExpirationTime.LowPart = 0xffffffffL;
|
|
authinf->inf.ExpirationTime.HighPart = 0x7fffffffL;
|
|
/* User SID */
|
|
authinf->inf.User.User.Sid = offset;
|
|
authinf->inf.User.User.Attributes = 0;
|
|
CopySid (GetLengthSid (usersid), (PSID) ((PBYTE) &authinf->inf + offset),
|
|
usersid);
|
|
offset += GetLengthSid (usersid);
|
|
/* Groups */
|
|
authinf->inf.Groups = offset;
|
|
gsids = (PCYG_TOKEN_GROUPS) ((PBYTE) &authinf->inf + offset);
|
|
sids_offset = offset + sizeof (ULONG) + non_well_known_cnt
|
|
* sizeof (SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES);
|
|
gsids->GroupCount = non_well_known_cnt;
|
|
/* Group SIDs */
|
|
tmpidx = -1;
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < non_well_known_cnt; ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((tmpidx = tmp_gsids.next_non_well_known_sid (tmpidx)) < 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
gsids->Groups[i].Sid = sids_offset;
|
|
gsids->Groups[i].Attributes = SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
|
|
| SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
|
|
| SE_GROUP_ENABLED;
|
|
/* Mark logon SID as logon SID :) */
|
|
if (wincap.needs_logon_sid_in_sid_list ()
|
|
&& tmp_gsids.sids[tmpidx] == fake_logon_sid)
|
|
gsids->Groups[i].Attributes += SE_GROUP_LOGON_ID;
|
|
CopySid (GetLengthSid (tmp_gsids.sids[tmpidx]),
|
|
(PSID) ((PBYTE) &authinf->inf + sids_offset),
|
|
tmp_gsids.sids[tmpidx]);
|
|
sids_offset += GetLengthSid (tmp_gsids.sids[tmpidx]);
|
|
}
|
|
offset += gsize;
|
|
/* Primary Group SID */
|
|
authinf->inf.PrimaryGroup.PrimaryGroup = offset;
|
|
CopySid (GetLengthSid (pgrpsid), (PSID) ((PBYTE) &authinf->inf + offset),
|
|
pgrpsid);
|
|
offset += GetLengthSid (pgrpsid);
|
|
/* Privileges */
|
|
authinf->inf.Privileges = offset;
|
|
memcpy ((PBYTE) &authinf->inf + offset, privs, psize);
|
|
offset += psize;
|
|
/* Owner */
|
|
authinf->inf.Owner.Owner = 0;
|
|
/* Default DACL */
|
|
authinf->inf.DefaultDacl.DefaultDacl = offset;
|
|
memcpy ((PBYTE) &authinf->inf + offset, dacl, dsize);
|
|
|
|
authinf->checksum = CYGWIN_VERSION_MAGIC (CYGWIN_VERSION_DLL_MAJOR,
|
|
CYGWIN_VERSION_DLL_MINOR);
|
|
PDWORD csp = (PDWORD) &authinf->username;
|
|
PDWORD csp_end = (PDWORD) ((PBYTE) authinf + authinf_size);
|
|
while (csp < csp_end)
|
|
authinf->checksum += *csp++;
|
|
|
|
/* Try to logon... */
|
|
ret = LsaLogonUser (lsa_hdl, (PLSA_STRING) &origin, Interactive, package_id,
|
|
authinf, authinf_size, NULL, &ts, &profile, &size, &luid,
|
|
&user_token, "a, &ret2);
|
|
if (ret != STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("LsaLogonUser: %p", ret);
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (LsaNtStatusToWinError (ret));
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (profile)
|
|
LsaFreeReturnBuffer (profile);
|
|
|
|
if (wincap.has_mandatory_integrity_control ())
|
|
{
|
|
typedef struct _TOKEN_LINKED_TOKEN
|
|
{
|
|
HANDLE LinkedToken;
|
|
} TOKEN_LINKED_TOKEN, *PTOKEN_LINKED_TOKEN;
|
|
# define TokenLinkedToken ((TOKEN_INFORMATION_CLASS) 19)
|
|
|
|
TOKEN_LINKED_TOKEN linked;
|
|
|
|
if (GetTokenInformation (user_token, TokenLinkedToken,
|
|
(PVOID) &linked, sizeof linked, &size))
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("Linked Token: %lu", linked.LinkedToken);
|
|
if (linked.LinkedToken)
|
|
user_token = linked.LinkedToken;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (privs)
|
|
free (privs);
|
|
close_local_policy (lsa);
|
|
if (lsa_hdl)
|
|
LsaDeregisterLogonProcess (lsa_hdl);
|
|
pop_self_privilege ();
|
|
|
|
debug_printf ("0x%x = lsaauth ()", user_token);
|
|
return user_token;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* read_sd reads a security descriptor from a file.
|
|
In case of error, -1 is returned and errno is set.
|
|
If sd_buf is too small, 0 is returned and sd_size
|
|
is set to the needed buffer size.
|
|
On success, 1 is returned.
|
|
|
|
GetFileSecurity() is used instead of BackupRead()
|
|
to avoid access denied errors if the caller has
|
|
not the permission to open that file for read.
|
|
|
|
Originally the function should return the size
|
|
of the SD on success. Unfortunately NT returns
|
|
0 in `len' on success, while W2K returns the
|
|
correct size!
|
|
|
|
2003-11-26: Now the function allocates the space needed by itself so
|
|
it knows the real size and returns it in the security_descriptor object.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
LONG
|
|
read_sd (const char *file, security_descriptor &sd)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
DWORD len = 0;
|
|
const char *pfile = file;
|
|
char fbuf[CYG_MAX_PATH];
|
|
if (current_codepage == oem_cp)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD fname_len = min (sizeof (fbuf) - 1, strlen (file));
|
|
bzero (fbuf, sizeof (fbuf));
|
|
OemToCharBuff (file, fbuf, fname_len);
|
|
pfile = fbuf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!GetFileSecurity (pfile,
|
|
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION
|
|
| GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION
|
|
| DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
|
|
NULL, 0, &len)
|
|
&& GetLastError () != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("file %s", file);
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
debug_printf ("file %s: len %d", file, len);
|
|
if (!sd.malloc (len))
|
|
{
|
|
set_errno (ENOMEM);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!GetFileSecurity (pfile,
|
|
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION
|
|
| GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION
|
|
| DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
|
|
sd, len, &len))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return sd.size ();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LONG
|
|
write_sd (HANDLE fh, const char *file, security_descriptor &sd)
|
|
{
|
|
NTSTATUS ret = STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
|
int retry = 0;
|
|
int res = -1;
|
|
for (; retry < 2; ++retry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (retry && (fh = CreateFile (file, WRITE_OWNER | WRITE_DAC,
|
|
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
|
|
&sec_none_nih, OPEN_EXISTING,
|
|
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL
|
|
| FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS,
|
|
NULL)) == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (fh && (ret = NtSetSecurityObject (fh,
|
|
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION
|
|
| GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION
|
|
| OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
|
|
sd)) == STATUS_SUCCESS)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (retry && fh != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
|
|
CloseHandle (fh);
|
|
if (fh == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) /* CreateFile failed */
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
else if (ret != STATUS_SUCCESS) /* NtSetSecurityObject failed */
|
|
__seterrno_from_nt_status (ret);
|
|
else /* Everything's fine. */
|
|
res = 0;
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
get_attribute_from_acl (mode_t *attribute, PACL acl, PSID owner_sid,
|
|
PSID group_sid, bool grp_member)
|
|
{
|
|
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *ace;
|
|
int allow = 0;
|
|
int deny = 0;
|
|
int *flags, *anti;
|
|
|
|
for (DWORD i = 0; i < acl->AceCount; ++i)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!GetAce (acl, i, (PVOID *) &ace))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (ace->Header.AceFlags & INHERIT_ONLY)
|
|
continue;
|
|
switch (ace->Header.AceType)
|
|
{
|
|
case ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE:
|
|
flags = &allow;
|
|
anti = &deny;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE:
|
|
flags = &deny;
|
|
anti = &allow;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cygpsid ace_sid ((PSID) &ace->SidStart);
|
|
if (ace_sid == well_known_world_sid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_BITS)
|
|
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IROTH)) ? S_IROTH : 0)
|
|
| ((!(*anti & S_IRGRP)) ? S_IRGRP : 0)
|
|
| ((!(*anti & S_IRUSR)) ? S_IRUSR : 0);
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_BITS)
|
|
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IWOTH)) ? S_IWOTH : 0)
|
|
| ((!(*anti & S_IWGRP)) ? S_IWGRP : 0)
|
|
| ((!(*anti & S_IWUSR)) ? S_IWUSR : 0);
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_EXEC_BITS)
|
|
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IXOTH)) ? S_IXOTH : 0)
|
|
| ((!(*anti & S_IXGRP)) ? S_IXGRP : 0)
|
|
| ((!(*anti & S_IXUSR)) ? S_IXUSR : 0);
|
|
if ((S_ISDIR (*attribute)) &&
|
|
(ace->Mask & (FILE_WRITE_DATA | FILE_EXECUTE | FILE_DELETE_CHILD))
|
|
== (FILE_WRITE_DATA | FILE_EXECUTE))
|
|
*flags |= S_ISVTX;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ace_sid == well_known_null_sid)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Read SUID, SGID and VTX bits from NULL ACE. */
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_DATA)
|
|
*flags |= S_ISVTX;
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_DATA)
|
|
*flags |= S_ISGID;
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_APPEND_DATA)
|
|
*flags |= S_ISUID;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ace_sid == owner_sid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_BITS)
|
|
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IRUSR)) ? S_IRUSR : 0);
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_BITS)
|
|
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IWUSR)) ? S_IWUSR : 0);
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_EXEC_BITS)
|
|
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IXUSR)) ? S_IXUSR : 0);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ace_sid == group_sid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_READ_BITS)
|
|
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IRGRP)) ? S_IRGRP : 0)
|
|
| ((grp_member && !(*anti & S_IRUSR)) ? S_IRUSR : 0);
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_WRITE_BITS)
|
|
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IWGRP)) ? S_IWGRP : 0)
|
|
| ((grp_member && !(*anti & S_IWUSR)) ? S_IWUSR : 0);
|
|
if (ace->Mask & FILE_EXEC_BITS)
|
|
*flags |= ((!(*anti & S_IXGRP)) ? S_IXGRP : 0)
|
|
| ((grp_member && !(*anti & S_IXUSR)) ? S_IXUSR : 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
*attribute &= ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO | S_ISVTX | S_ISGID | S_ISUID);
|
|
if (owner_sid && group_sid && EqualSid (owner_sid, group_sid)
|
|
/* FIXME: temporary exception for /var/empty */
|
|
&& well_known_system_sid != group_sid)
|
|
{
|
|
allow &= ~(S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP);
|
|
allow |= (((allow & S_IRUSR) ? S_IRGRP : 0)
|
|
| ((allow & S_IWUSR) ? S_IWGRP : 0)
|
|
| ((allow & S_IXUSR) ? S_IXGRP : 0));
|
|
}
|
|
*attribute |= allow;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
get_info_from_sd (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psd, mode_t *attribute,
|
|
__uid32_t *uidret, __gid32_t *gidret)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!psd)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If reading the security descriptor failed, treat the object
|
|
as unreadable. */
|
|
if (attribute)
|
|
*attribute &= ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO);
|
|
if (uidret)
|
|
*uidret = ILLEGAL_UID;
|
|
if (gidret)
|
|
*gidret = ILLEGAL_GID;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cygpsid owner_sid;
|
|
cygpsid group_sid;
|
|
BOOL dummy;
|
|
|
|
if (!GetSecurityDescriptorOwner (psd, (PSID *) &owner_sid, &dummy))
|
|
debug_printf ("GetSecurityDescriptorOwner %E");
|
|
if (!GetSecurityDescriptorGroup (psd, (PSID *) &group_sid, &dummy))
|
|
debug_printf ("GetSecurityDescriptorGroup %E");
|
|
|
|
__uid32_t uid;
|
|
__gid32_t gid;
|
|
bool grp_member = get_sids_info (owner_sid, group_sid, &uid, &gid);
|
|
if (uidret)
|
|
*uidret = uid;
|
|
if (gidret)
|
|
*gidret = gid;
|
|
|
|
if (!attribute)
|
|
{
|
|
syscall_printf ("uid %d, gid %d", uid, gid);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PACL acl;
|
|
BOOL acl_exists;
|
|
|
|
if (!GetSecurityDescriptorDacl (psd, &acl_exists, &acl, &dummy))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
debug_printf ("GetSecurityDescriptorDacl %E");
|
|
*attribute &= ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!acl_exists || !acl)
|
|
*attribute |= S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO;
|
|
else
|
|
get_attribute_from_acl (attribute, acl, owner_sid, group_sid, grp_member);
|
|
|
|
syscall_printf ("%sACL %x, uid %d, gid %d",
|
|
(!acl_exists || !acl)?"NO ":"", *attribute, uid, gid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
get_nt_object_security (HANDLE handle, SE_OBJECT_TYPE object_type,
|
|
security_descriptor &sd_ret)
|
|
{
|
|
sd_ret.free ();
|
|
/* Don't use NtQuerySecurityObject. It doesn't recognize predefined
|
|
registry keys. */
|
|
DWORD ret = GetSecurityInfo (handle, object_type,
|
|
DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION
|
|
| GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION
|
|
| OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
|
|
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, sd_ret);
|
|
if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno_from_win_error (ret);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
get_object_attribute (HANDLE handle, SE_OBJECT_TYPE object_type,
|
|
mode_t *attribute, __uid32_t *uidret, __gid32_t *gidret)
|
|
{
|
|
if (allow_ntsec)
|
|
{
|
|
security_descriptor sd;
|
|
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psd = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (get_nt_object_security (handle, object_type, sd))
|
|
{
|
|
if (object_type == SE_FILE_OBJECT)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
psd = sd;
|
|
get_info_from_sd (psd, attribute, uidret, gidret);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* The entries are already set to default values */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
get_file_attribute (int use_ntsec, HANDLE handle, const char *file,
|
|
mode_t *attribute, __uid32_t *uidret, __gid32_t *gidret)
|
|
{
|
|
int res;
|
|
syscall_printf ("file: %s", file);
|
|
|
|
if (use_ntsec && allow_ntsec)
|
|
{
|
|
security_descriptor sd;
|
|
|
|
if (!handle || get_nt_object_security (handle, SE_FILE_OBJECT, sd))
|
|
read_sd (file, sd);
|
|
get_info_from_sd (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (uidret)
|
|
*uidret = myself->uid;
|
|
if (gidret)
|
|
*gidret = myself->gid;
|
|
|
|
if (!attribute)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (allow_ntea)
|
|
{
|
|
int oatt = *attribute;
|
|
res = read_ea (handle, file, ".UNIXATTR", (char *)attribute,
|
|
sizeof (*attribute));
|
|
*attribute |= oatt;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
res = 0;
|
|
|
|
return res > 0 ? 0 : -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
add_access_allowed_ace (PACL acl, int offset, DWORD attributes,
|
|
PSID sid, size_t &len_add, DWORD inherit)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!AddAccessAllowedAce (acl, ACL_REVISION, attributes, sid))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *ace;
|
|
if (inherit && GetAce (acl, offset, (PVOID *) &ace))
|
|
ace->Header.AceFlags |= inherit;
|
|
len_add += sizeof (ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE) - sizeof (DWORD) + GetLengthSid (sid);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
add_access_denied_ace (PACL acl, int offset, DWORD attributes,
|
|
PSID sid, size_t &len_add, DWORD inherit)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!AddAccessDeniedAce (acl, ACL_REVISION, attributes, sid))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
ACCESS_DENIED_ACE *ace;
|
|
if (inherit && GetAce (acl, offset, (PVOID *) &ace))
|
|
ace->Header.AceFlags |= inherit;
|
|
len_add += sizeof (ACCESS_DENIED_ACE) - sizeof (DWORD) + GetLengthSid (sid);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR
|
|
alloc_sd (__uid32_t uid, __gid32_t gid, int attribute,
|
|
security_descriptor &sd_ret)
|
|
{
|
|
BOOL dummy;
|
|
|
|
debug_printf("uid %d, gid %d, attribute %x", uid, gid, attribute);
|
|
|
|
/* Get owner and group from current security descriptor. */
|
|
PSID cur_owner_sid = NULL;
|
|
PSID cur_group_sid = NULL;
|
|
if (!GetSecurityDescriptorOwner (sd_ret, &cur_owner_sid, &dummy))
|
|
debug_printf ("GetSecurityDescriptorOwner %E");
|
|
if (!GetSecurityDescriptorGroup (sd_ret, &cur_group_sid, &dummy))
|
|
debug_printf ("GetSecurityDescriptorGroup %E");
|
|
|
|
/* Get SID of owner. */
|
|
cygsid owner_sid;
|
|
/* Check for current user first */
|
|
if (uid == myself->uid)
|
|
owner_sid = cygheap->user.sid ();
|
|
else if (uid == ILLEGAL_UID)
|
|
owner_sid = cur_owner_sid;
|
|
else if (!owner_sid.getfrompw (internal_getpwuid (uid)))
|
|
{
|
|
set_errno (EINVAL);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
owner_sid.debug_print ("alloc_sd: owner SID =");
|
|
|
|
/* Get SID of new group. */
|
|
cygsid group_sid;
|
|
/* Check for current user first */
|
|
if (gid == myself->gid)
|
|
group_sid = cygheap->user.groups.pgsid;
|
|
else if (gid == ILLEGAL_GID)
|
|
group_sid = cur_group_sid;
|
|
else if (!group_sid.getfromgr (internal_getgrgid (gid)))
|
|
{
|
|
set_errno (EINVAL);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
group_sid.debug_print ("alloc_sd: group SID =");
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize local security descriptor. */
|
|
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd;
|
|
if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor (&sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We set the SE_DACL_PROTECTED flag here to prevent the DACL from being
|
|
* modified by inheritable ACEs.
|
|
* This flag as well as the SetSecurityDescriptorControl call are available
|
|
* only since Win2K.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (wincap.has_security_descriptor_control ())
|
|
SetSecurityDescriptorControl (&sd, SE_DACL_PROTECTED, SE_DACL_PROTECTED);
|
|
|
|
/* Create owner for local security descriptor. */
|
|
if (!SetSecurityDescriptorOwner (&sd, owner_sid, FALSE))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create group for local security descriptor. */
|
|
if (!SetSecurityDescriptorGroup (&sd, group_sid, FALSE))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize local access control list. */
|
|
PACL acl = (PACL) alloca (3072);
|
|
if (!InitializeAcl (acl, 3072, ACL_REVISION))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* From here fill ACL. */
|
|
size_t acl_len = sizeof (ACL);
|
|
int ace_off = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Construct allow attribute for owner. */
|
|
DWORD owner_allow = STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL
|
|
| FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_EA;
|
|
/* This has nothing to do with traverse checking in the first place, but
|
|
since traverse checking is the setting which switches to POSIX-like
|
|
permission rules, the below is all too similar. Removing the delete
|
|
bit for a file or directory results in checking the parent directories'
|
|
ACL, if the current user has the FILE_DELETE_CHILD bit set. This is
|
|
how it is on POSIX systems. */
|
|
if (allow_traverse)
|
|
owner_allow &= ~DELETE;
|
|
if (attribute & S_IRUSR)
|
|
owner_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_READ;
|
|
if (attribute & S_IWUSR)
|
|
owner_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
|
|
if (attribute & S_IXUSR)
|
|
owner_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE;
|
|
if (S_ISDIR (attribute)
|
|
&& (attribute & (S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR)) == (S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR))
|
|
owner_allow |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
|
|
|
|
/* Construct allow attribute for group. */
|
|
DWORD group_allow = STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ
|
|
| FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_READ_EA;
|
|
if (attribute & S_IRGRP)
|
|
group_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_READ;
|
|
if (attribute & S_IWGRP)
|
|
group_allow |= STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE | FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
|
|
if (attribute & S_IXGRP)
|
|
group_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE;
|
|
if (S_ISDIR (attribute)
|
|
&& (attribute & (S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP)) == (S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP)
|
|
&& !(attribute & S_ISVTX))
|
|
group_allow |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
|
|
|
|
/* Construct allow attribute for everyone. */
|
|
DWORD other_allow = STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ
|
|
| FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_READ_EA;
|
|
if (attribute & S_IROTH)
|
|
other_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_READ;
|
|
if (attribute & S_IWOTH)
|
|
other_allow |= STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE | FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
|
|
if (attribute & S_IXOTH)
|
|
other_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE;
|
|
if (S_ISDIR (attribute)
|
|
&& (attribute & (S_IWOTH | S_IXOTH)) == (S_IWOTH | S_IXOTH)
|
|
&& !(attribute & S_ISVTX))
|
|
other_allow |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
|
|
|
|
/* Construct SUID, SGID and VTX bits in NULL ACE. */
|
|
DWORD null_allow = 0L;
|
|
if (attribute & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX))
|
|
{
|
|
if (attribute & S_ISUID)
|
|
null_allow |= FILE_APPEND_DATA;
|
|
if (attribute & S_ISGID)
|
|
null_allow |= FILE_WRITE_DATA;
|
|
if (attribute & S_ISVTX)
|
|
null_allow |= FILE_READ_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add owner and group permissions if SIDs are equal
|
|
and construct deny attributes for group and owner. */
|
|
bool isownergroup;
|
|
if ((isownergroup = (owner_sid == group_sid)))
|
|
owner_allow |= group_allow;
|
|
|
|
DWORD owner_deny = ~owner_allow & (group_allow | other_allow);
|
|
owner_deny &= ~(STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ
|
|
| FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_READ_EA
|
|
| FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_EA);
|
|
|
|
DWORD group_deny = ~group_allow & other_allow;
|
|
group_deny &= ~(STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ
|
|
| FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_READ_EA);
|
|
|
|
/* Set deny ACE for owner. */
|
|
if (owner_deny
|
|
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, ace_off++, owner_deny,
|
|
owner_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Set deny ACE for group here to respect the canonical order,
|
|
if this does not impact owner */
|
|
if (group_deny && !(group_deny & owner_allow) && !isownergroup
|
|
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, ace_off++, group_deny,
|
|
group_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Set allow ACE for owner. */
|
|
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, owner_allow,
|
|
owner_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Set deny ACE for group, if still needed. */
|
|
if (group_deny & owner_allow && !isownergroup
|
|
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, ace_off++, group_deny,
|
|
group_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Set allow ACE for group. */
|
|
if (!isownergroup
|
|
&& !add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, group_allow,
|
|
group_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Set allow ACE for everyone. */
|
|
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, other_allow,
|
|
well_known_world_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Set null ACE for special bits. */
|
|
if (null_allow
|
|
&& !add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, null_allow,
|
|
well_known_null_sid, acl_len, NO_INHERITANCE))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Fill ACL with unrelated ACEs from current security descriptor. */
|
|
PACL oacl;
|
|
BOOL acl_exists = FALSE;
|
|
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *ace;
|
|
if (GetSecurityDescriptorDacl (sd_ret, &acl_exists, &oacl, &dummy)
|
|
&& acl_exists && oacl)
|
|
for (DWORD i = 0; i < oacl->AceCount; ++i)
|
|
if (GetAce (oacl, i, (PVOID *) &ace))
|
|
{
|
|
cygpsid ace_sid ((PSID) &ace->SidStart);
|
|
|
|
/* Check for related ACEs. */
|
|
if (ace_sid == well_known_null_sid)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if ((ace_sid == cur_owner_sid)
|
|
|| (ace_sid == owner_sid)
|
|
|| (ace_sid == cur_group_sid)
|
|
|| (ace_sid == group_sid)
|
|
|| (ace_sid == well_known_world_sid))
|
|
{
|
|
if (ace->Header.AceFlags & SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT)
|
|
ace->Header.AceFlags |= INHERIT_ONLY;
|
|
else
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add unrelated ACCESS_DENIED_ACE to the beginning but
|
|
* behind the owner_deny, ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE to the end.
|
|
* FIXME: this would break the order of the inherit_only ACEs
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!AddAce (acl, ACL_REVISION,
|
|
ace->Header.AceType == ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE?
|
|
(owner_deny ? 1 : 0) : MAXDWORD,
|
|
(LPVOID) ace, ace->Header.AceSize))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
acl_len += ace->Header.AceSize;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Construct appropriate inherit attribute for new directories */
|
|
if (S_ISDIR (attribute) && !acl_exists)
|
|
{
|
|
const DWORD inherit = SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT | INHERIT_ONLY;
|
|
|
|
#if 0 /* FIXME: Not done currently as this breaks the canonical order */
|
|
/* Set deny ACE for owner. */
|
|
if (owner_deny
|
|
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, ace_off++, owner_deny,
|
|
well_known_creator_owner_sid, acl_len, inherit))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Set deny ACE for group here to respect the canonical order,
|
|
if this does not impact owner */
|
|
if (group_deny && !(group_deny & owner_allow)
|
|
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, ace_off++, group_deny,
|
|
well_known_creator_group_sid, acl_len, inherit))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Set allow ACE for owner. */
|
|
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, owner_allow,
|
|
well_known_creator_owner_sid, acl_len, inherit))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
#if 0 /* FIXME: Not done currently as this breaks the canonical order and
|
|
won't be preserved on chown and chmod */
|
|
/* Set deny ACE for group, conflicting with owner_allow. */
|
|
if (group_deny & owner_allow
|
|
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, ace_off++, group_deny,
|
|
well_known_creator_group_sid, acl_len, inherit))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* Set allow ACE for group. */
|
|
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, group_allow,
|
|
well_known_creator_group_sid, acl_len, inherit))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Set allow ACE for everyone. */
|
|
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, ace_off++, other_allow,
|
|
well_known_world_sid, acl_len, inherit))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set AclSize to computed value. */
|
|
acl->AclSize = acl_len;
|
|
debug_printf ("ACL-Size: %d", acl_len);
|
|
|
|
/* Create DACL for local security descriptor. */
|
|
if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl (&sd, TRUE, acl, FALSE))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make self relative security descriptor. */
|
|
DWORD sd_size = 0;
|
|
MakeSelfRelativeSD (&sd, sd_ret, &sd_size);
|
|
if (sd_size <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sd_ret.malloc (sd_size))
|
|
{
|
|
set_errno (ENOMEM);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!MakeSelfRelativeSD (&sd, sd_ret, &sd_size))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
debug_printf ("Created SD-Size: %u", sd_ret.size ());
|
|
|
|
return sd_ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
set_security_attribute (int attribute, PSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES psa,
|
|
security_descriptor &sd)
|
|
{
|
|
psa->lpSecurityDescriptor = sd.malloc (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
|
|
InitializeSecurityDescriptor ((PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)psa->lpSecurityDescriptor,
|
|
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
|
|
psa->lpSecurityDescriptor = alloc_sd (geteuid32 (), getegid32 (),
|
|
attribute, sd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
set_nt_attribute (HANDLE handle, const char *file,
|
|
__uid32_t uid, __gid32_t gid, int attribute)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!wincap.has_security ())
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
security_descriptor sd;
|
|
|
|
if ((!handle || get_nt_object_security (handle, SE_FILE_OBJECT, sd))
|
|
&& read_sd (file, sd) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
debug_printf ("read_sd %E");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!alloc_sd (uid, gid, attribute, sd))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return write_sd (handle, file, sd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
set_file_attribute (bool use_ntsec, HANDLE handle, const char *file,
|
|
__uid32_t uid, __gid32_t gid, int attribute)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (use_ntsec && allow_ntsec)
|
|
ret = set_nt_attribute (handle, file, uid, gid, attribute);
|
|
else if (allow_ntea && !write_ea (handle, file, ".UNIXATTR",
|
|
(char *) &attribute, sizeof (attribute)))
|
|
{
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
syscall_printf ("%d = set_file_attribute (%s, %d, %d, %p)",
|
|
ret, file, uid, gid, attribute);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
set_file_attribute (bool use_ntsec, HANDLE handle, const char *file,
|
|
int attribute)
|
|
{
|
|
return set_file_attribute (use_ntsec, handle, file,
|
|
myself->uid, myself->gid, attribute);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
check_access (security_descriptor &sd, GENERIC_MAPPING &mapping,
|
|
DWORD desired, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
BOOL status;
|
|
DWORD granted;
|
|
DWORD plen = sizeof (PRIVILEGE_SET) + 3 * sizeof (LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES);
|
|
PPRIVILEGE_SET pset = (PPRIVILEGE_SET) alloca (plen);
|
|
HANDLE tok = cygheap->user.issetuid () ? cygheap->user.token ()
|
|
: hProcImpToken;
|
|
|
|
if (!tok && !DuplicateTokenEx (hProcToken, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, NULL,
|
|
SecurityImpersonation, TokenImpersonation,
|
|
&hProcImpToken))
|
|
#ifdef DEBUGGING
|
|
system_printf ("DuplicateTokenEx failed, %E");
|
|
#else
|
|
syscall_printf ("DuplicateTokenEx failed, %E");
|
|
#endif
|
|
else
|
|
tok = hProcImpToken;
|
|
|
|
if (!AccessCheck (sd, tok, desired, &mapping, pset, &plen, &granted, &status))
|
|
__seterrno ();
|
|
else if (!status)
|
|
{
|
|
/* CV, 2006-10-16: Now, that's really weird. Imagine a user who has no
|
|
standard access to a file, but who has backup and restore privileges
|
|
and these privileges are enabled in the access token. One would
|
|
expect that the AccessCheck function takes this into consideration
|
|
when returning the access status. Otherwise, why bother with the
|
|
pset parameter, right?
|
|
But not so. AccessCheck actually returns a status of "false" here,
|
|
even though opening a file with backup resp. restore intent
|
|
naturally succeeds for this user. This definitely spoils the results
|
|
of access(2) for administrative users or the SYSTEM account. So, in
|
|
case the access check fails, another check against the user's
|
|
backup/restore privileges has to be made. Sigh. */
|
|
int granted_flags = 0;
|
|
if (flags & R_OK)
|
|
{
|
|
pset->PrivilegeCount = 1;
|
|
pset->Control = 0;
|
|
pset->Privilege[0].Luid = *privilege_luid (SE_BACKUP_PRIV);
|
|
pset->Privilege[0].Attributes = 0;
|
|
if (PrivilegeCheck (tok, pset, &status) && status)
|
|
granted_flags |= R_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
if (flags & W_OK)
|
|
{
|
|
pset->PrivilegeCount = 1;
|
|
pset->Control = 0;
|
|
pset->Privilege[0].Luid = *privilege_luid (SE_RESTORE_PRIV);
|
|
pset->Privilege[0].Attributes = 0;
|
|
if (PrivilegeCheck (tok, pset, &status) && status)
|
|
granted_flags |= W_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
if (granted_flags == flags)
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
set_errno (EACCES);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
check_file_access (const char *fn, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
security_descriptor sd;
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
static GENERIC_MAPPING NO_COPY mapping = { FILE_GENERIC_READ,
|
|
FILE_GENERIC_WRITE,
|
|
FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE,
|
|
FILE_ALL_ACCESS };
|
|
DWORD desired = 0;
|
|
if (flags & R_OK)
|
|
desired |= FILE_READ_DATA;
|
|
if (flags & W_OK)
|
|
desired |= FILE_WRITE_DATA;
|
|
if (flags & X_OK)
|
|
desired |= FILE_EXECUTE;
|
|
if (read_sd (fn, sd) > 0)
|
|
ret = check_access (sd, mapping, desired, flags);
|
|
debug_printf ("flags %x, ret %d", flags, ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
check_registry_access (HANDLE hdl, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
security_descriptor sd;
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
static GENERIC_MAPPING NO_COPY mapping = { KEY_READ,
|
|
KEY_WRITE,
|
|
KEY_EXECUTE,
|
|
KEY_ALL_ACCESS };
|
|
DWORD desired = 0;
|
|
if (flags & R_OK)
|
|
desired |= KEY_ENUMERATE_SUB_KEYS;
|
|
if (flags & W_OK)
|
|
desired |= KEY_SET_VALUE;
|
|
if (flags & X_OK)
|
|
desired |= KEY_QUERY_VALUE;
|
|
if (!get_nt_object_security (hdl, SE_REGISTRY_KEY, sd))
|
|
ret = check_access (sd, mapping, desired, flags);
|
|
/* As long as we can't write the registry... */
|
|
if (flags & W_OK)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
debug_printf ("flags %x, ret %d", flags, ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|