First cut of full implementation of new permission handling

* fhandler.cc (fhandler_base::open_with_arch): Call open with mode
        not umasked.
        (fhandler_base::open): Explicitely umask mode on NFS here.  Call new
        set_created_file_access rather than set_file_attribute.
        * fhandler_disk_file.cc (fhandler_disk_file::fchmod): Reimplement
        setting permissions on filesystems supporting ACLs using the new
        set_posix_access call.
        (fhandler_disk_file::fchown): Ditto.
        (fhandler_disk_file::mkdir): Call new set_created_file_access rather
        than set_file_attribute.
        * fhandler_socket.cc (fhandler_socket::bind): Don't umask here.  Add
        WRITE_OWNER access to allow writing group in case of SGID bit set.
        Call new set_created_file_access rather than set_file_attribute.
        * path.cc (symlink_worker): Call new set_created_file_access rather
        than set_file_attribute.
        * sec_acl.cc (searchace): Un-staticize.
        (set_posix_access): New, complementary functionality to
        get_posix_access.
        (setacl): Implement in terms of get_posix_access/set_posix_access.
        (get_posix_access): Add handling for just created files requiring
        their first Cygwin ACL.  Fix new_style recognition.  Handle SGID
        bit.  For old-style ACLs, ignore SYSTEM and Administrators when
        computing the {DEF_}CLASS_OBJ perms.
        * security.cc (get_file_sd): Revamp comment.  Change and (hopefully)
        speed up inheritance processing for just created files.
        (alloc_sd): Remove.
        (set_security_attribute): Call set_posix_access instead of alloc_sd.
        (get_object_attribute): Fix return value.
        (create_object_sd_from_attribute): Call set_posix_access instead of
        alloc_sd.
        (set_file_attribute): Remove.
        (set_created_file_access): New function implemented in terms of
        get_posix_access/set_posix_access.
        * security.h (set_file_attribute): Remove prototype.
        (set_created_file_access): Add prototype.
        (searchace): Ditto.
        (set_posix_access): Ditto.
        * syscalls.cc (open): Call open_with_arch with mode not umasked.

Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
This commit is contained in:
Corinna Vinschen
2015-04-10 11:25:40 +02:00
parent aadd5f0295
commit a44e09fd49
10 changed files with 638 additions and 731 deletions

View File

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ details. */
#include "winsup.h"
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/acl.h>
#include "cygerrno.h"
#include "security.h"
#include "path.h"
@ -34,7 +35,6 @@ static GENERIC_MAPPING NO_COPY_RO file_mapping = { FILE_GENERIC_READ,
FILE_GENERIC_WRITE,
FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE,
FILE_ALL_ACCESS };
LONG
get_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd,
bool justcreated)
@ -85,62 +85,46 @@ get_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd,
return -1;
}
}
/* Ok, so we have a security descriptor now. Unfortunately, if you want
to know if an ACE is inherited from the parent object, you can't just
call NtQuerySecurityObject once. The problem is this:
/* We have a security descriptor now. Unfortunately, if you want to know
if an ACE is inherited from the parent object, this isn't sufficient.
In the simple case, the SDs control word contains one of the
SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED or SE_DACL_PROTECTED flags, or at least one of
the ACEs has the INHERITED_ACE flag set. In all of these cases the
GetSecurityInfo function calls NtQuerySecurityObject only once, too,
apparently because it figures that the DACL is self-sufficient, which
it usually is. Windows Explorer, for instance, takes great care to
set these flags in a security descriptor if you change the ACL in the
GUI property dialog.
the ACEs has the INHERITED_ACE flag set. In all of these cases we
know the DACL has been inherited.
The tricky case is if none of these flags is set in the SD. That means
the information whether or not an ACE has been inherited is not available
in the DACL of the object. In this case GetSecurityInfo also fetches the
SD from the parent directory and tests if the object's SD contains
inherited ACEs from the parent. The below code is closly emulating the
behaviour of GetSecurityInfo so we can get rid of this advapi32 dependency.
If none of these flags is set in the SD, the information whether
or not an ACE has been inherited is not available in the DACL of the
object. In this case GetSecurityInfo fetches the SD from the parent
directory and tests if the object's SD contains inherited ACEs from the
parent.
However, this functionality is slow, and the extra information is only
required when the file has been created and the permissions are about
to be set to POSIX permissions. Therefore we only use it in case the
file just got created.
Note that we're not testing the SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED and
SE_DACL_PROTECTED flags here because we know the state the file's SD
is in. Since we're creating all files with a NULL descriptor, the DACL
is either inherited from the parent, or it's the default DACL. In
neither case, one of these flags is set.
Note that GetSecurityInfo has a problem on 5.1 and 5.2 kernels. Sometimes
it returns ERROR_INVALID_ADDRESS if a former request for the parent
directories' SD used NtQuerySecurityObject, rather than GetSecurityInfo
as well. See http://cygwin.com/ml/cygwin-developers/2011-03/msg00027.html
for the solution. This problem does not occur with the below code, so
the workaround has been removed. */
For speed, we're not calling RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject
anymore (but keep the code here for reference). Rather we just test
if one of the parent's ACEs is inheritable. If so, we know we inherited
it and set the SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED flag. If not, we may assume our
object's DACL is the default DACL.
This functionality is slow and the extra information is only required
when the file has been created and the permissions are about to be set
to POSIX permissions. Therefore we only use it in case the file just
got created. */
if (justcreated)
{
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL ctrl;
ULONG dummy;
PACL dacl;
BOOLEAN exists, def;
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *ace;
UNICODE_STRING dirname;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psd, nsd;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psd;
tmp_pathbuf tp;
/* Check SDs control flags. If SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED or
SE_DACL_PROTECTED is set we're done. */
RtlGetControlSecurityDescriptor (sd, &ctrl, &dummy);
if (ctrl & (SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SE_DACL_PROTECTED))
return 0;
/* Otherwise iterate over the ACEs and see if any one of them has the
INHERITED_ACE flag set. If so, we're done. */
if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (sd, &exists, &dacl, &def))
&& exists && dacl)
for (ULONG idx = 0; idx < dacl->AceCount; ++idx)
if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetAce (dacl, idx, (PVOID *) &ace))
&& (ace->Header.AceFlags & INHERITED_ACE))
return 0;
/* Otherwise, open the parent directory with READ_CONTROL... */
/* Open the parent directory with READ_CONTROL... */
RtlSplitUnicodePath (pc.get_nt_native_path (), &dirname, NULL);
InitializeObjectAttributes (&attr, &dirname, pc.objcaseinsensitive (),
NULL, NULL);
@ -164,12 +148,14 @@ get_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd,
&dirname, status);
return 0;
}
#if 0
/* ... and create a new security descriptor in which all inherited ACEs
are marked with the INHERITED_ACE flag. For a description of the
undocumented RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject function from
ntdll.dll see the MSDN man page for the advapi32 function
ConvertToAutoInheritPrivateObjectSecurity. Fortunately the latter
is just a shim. */
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR nsd;
status = RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject (psd, sd, &nsd, NULL,
pc.isdir (),
&file_mapping);
@ -185,6 +171,36 @@ get_file_sd (HANDLE fh, path_conv &pc, security_descriptor &sd,
len = RtlLengthSecurityDescriptor (nsd);
memcpy ((PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) sd, nsd, len);
RtlDeleteSecurityObject (&nsd);
#else
/* ... and check the parent descriptor for inheritable ACEs matching
our current object type (file/dir). The simple truth in our case
is, either the parent dir had inheritable ACEs and all our ACEs are
inherited, or the parent dir didn't have inheritable ACEs and all
our ACEs are taken from the default DACL. */
bool inherited = false;
BYTE search_flags = pc.isdir () ? SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT
: SUB_OBJECTS_ONLY_INHERIT;
if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (psd, &exists, &dacl, &def))
&& exists && dacl)
for (ULONG idx = 0; idx < dacl->AceCount; ++idx)
if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetAce (dacl, idx, (PVOID *) &ace))
&& (ace->Header.AceFlags & search_flags))
{
inherited = true;
break;
}
/* Then, if the parent descriptor contained inheritable ACEs, we mark
the SD as SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED. Note that this requires the
matching check in get_posix_access. If we ever revert to
RtlConvertToAutoInheritSecurityObject, the check in get_posix_access
has to test every single ACE for the INHERITED_ACE flag again. */
if (inherited
&& NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (sd, &exists, &dacl,
&def))
&& exists && dacl)
RtlSetControlSecurityDescriptor (sd, SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED,
SE_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED);
#endif
}
return 0;
}
@ -340,363 +356,6 @@ add_access_denied_ace (PACL acl, DWORD attributes, PSID sid, size_t &len_add,
return true;
}
static PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR
alloc_sd (path_conv &pc, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int attribute,
security_descriptor &sd_ret)
{
NTSTATUS status;
BOOLEAN dummy;
tmp_pathbuf tp;
/* NOTE: If the high bit of attribute is set, we have just created
a file or directory. See below for an explanation. */
debug_printf("uid %u, gid %u, attribute 0%o", uid, gid, attribute);
/* Get owner and group from current security descriptor. */
PSID cur_owner_sid = NULL;
PSID cur_group_sid = NULL;
status = RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor (sd_ret, &cur_owner_sid, &dummy);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
debug_printf ("RtlGetOwnerSecurityDescriptor: %y", status);
status = RtlGetGroupSecurityDescriptor (sd_ret, &cur_group_sid, &dummy);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
debug_printf ("RtlGetGroupSecurityDescriptor: %y", status);
/* Get SID of owner. */
cygsid owner_sid;
/* Check for current user first */
if (uid == myself->uid)
owner_sid = cygheap->user.sid ();
else if (uid == ILLEGAL_UID)
owner_sid = cur_owner_sid;
else if (!owner_sid.getfrompw (internal_getpwuid (uid)))
{
set_errno (EINVAL);
return NULL;
}
owner_sid.debug_print ("alloc_sd: owner SID =");
/* Get SID of new group. */
cygsid group_sid;
/* Check for current user first */
if (gid == myself->gid)
group_sid = cygheap->user.groups.pgsid;
else if (gid == ILLEGAL_GID)
group_sid = cur_group_sid;
else if (!group_sid.getfromgr (internal_getgrgid (gid)))
{
set_errno (EINVAL);
return NULL;
}
group_sid.debug_print ("alloc_sd: group SID =");
/* Initialize local security descriptor. */
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR sd;
RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor (&sd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
/* We set the SE_DACL_PROTECTED flag here to prevent the DACL from being
modified by inheritable ACEs. */
RtlSetControlSecurityDescriptor (&sd, SE_DACL_PROTECTED, SE_DACL_PROTECTED);
/* Create owner for local security descriptor. */
status = RtlSetOwnerSecurityDescriptor (&sd, owner_sid, FALSE);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
return NULL;
}
/* Create group for local security descriptor. */
status = RtlSetGroupSecurityDescriptor (&sd, group_sid, FALSE);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
return NULL;
}
/* Initialize local access control list. */
PACL acl = (PACL) tp.w_get ();
RtlCreateAcl (acl, ACL_MAXIMUM_SIZE, ACL_REVISION);
/* From here fill ACL. */
size_t acl_len = sizeof (ACL);
/* Only used for sync objects (for ttys). The admins group should
always have the right to manipulate the ACL, so we have to make sure
that the ACL gives the admins group STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL access. */
bool saw_admins = false;
/* Construct allow attribute for owner.
Don't set FILE_READ/WRITE_ATTRIBUTES unconditionally on Samba, otherwise
it enforces read permissions. Same for other's below. */
DWORD owner_allow = STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL
| (pc.fs_is_samba ()
? 0 : (FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES));
if (attribute & S_IRUSR)
owner_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_READ;
if (attribute & S_IWUSR)
owner_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
if (attribute & S_IXUSR)
owner_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE & ~FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES;
if (S_ISDIR (attribute)
&& (attribute & (S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR)) == (S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR))
owner_allow |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
/* For sync objects note that the owner is admin. */
if (S_ISCHR (attribute) && owner_sid == well_known_admins_sid)
saw_admins = true;
/* Construct allow attribute for group. */
DWORD group_allow = STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ | SYNCHRONIZE
| (pc.fs_is_samba () ? 0 : FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES);
if (attribute & S_IRGRP)
group_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_READ;
if (attribute & S_IWGRP)
group_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
if (attribute & S_IXGRP)
group_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE & ~FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES;
if (S_ISDIR (attribute)
&& (attribute & (S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP)) == (S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP)
&& !(attribute & S_ISVTX))
group_allow |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
/* For sync objects, add STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL for admins group. */
if (S_ISCHR (attribute) && group_sid == well_known_admins_sid)
{
group_allow |= STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL;
saw_admins = true;
}
/* Construct allow attribute for everyone. */
DWORD other_allow = STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ | SYNCHRONIZE
| (pc.fs_is_samba () ? 0 : FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES);
if (attribute & S_IROTH)
other_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_READ;
if (attribute & S_IWOTH)
other_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
if (attribute & S_IXOTH)
other_allow |= FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE & ~FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES;
if (S_ISDIR (attribute)
&& (attribute & (S_IWOTH | S_IXOTH)) == (S_IWOTH | S_IXOTH)
&& !(attribute & S_ISVTX))
other_allow |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD;
/* Construct SUID, SGID and VTX bits in NULL ACE. */
DWORD null_allow = 0L;
if (attribute & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX))
{
if (attribute & S_ISUID)
null_allow |= FILE_APPEND_DATA;
if (attribute & S_ISGID)
null_allow |= FILE_WRITE_DATA;
if (attribute & S_ISVTX)
null_allow |= FILE_READ_DATA;
}
/* Add owner and group permissions if SIDs are equal
and construct deny attributes for group and owner. */
bool isownergroup;
if ((isownergroup = (owner_sid == group_sid)))
owner_allow |= group_allow;
DWORD owner_deny = ~owner_allow & (group_allow | other_allow);
owner_deny &= ~(STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ
| FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES);
DWORD group_deny = ~group_allow & other_allow;
group_deny &= ~(STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES);
/* Set deny ACE for owner. */
if (owner_deny
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, owner_deny, owner_sid, acl_len,
NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Set deny ACE for group here to respect the canonical order,
if this does not impact owner */
if (group_deny && !(group_deny & owner_allow) && !isownergroup
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, group_deny, group_sid, acl_len,
NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Set allow ACE for owner. */
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, owner_allow, owner_sid, acl_len,
NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Set deny ACE for group, if still needed. */
if ((group_deny & owner_allow) && !isownergroup
&& !add_access_denied_ace (acl, group_deny, group_sid, acl_len,
NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Set allow ACE for group. */
if (!isownergroup
&& !add_access_allowed_ace (acl, group_allow, group_sid, acl_len,
NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* For sync objects, if we didn't see the admins group so far, add entry
with STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL access. */
if (S_ISCHR (attribute) && !saw_admins)
{
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, STANDARD_RIGHTS_ALL,
well_known_admins_sid, acl_len,
NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
saw_admins = true;
}
/* Set allow ACE for everyone. */
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, other_allow, well_known_world_sid, acl_len,
NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Set null ACE for special bits. */
if (null_allow
&& !add_access_allowed_ace (acl, null_allow, well_known_null_sid, acl_len,
NO_INHERITANCE))
return NULL;
/* Fill ACL with unrelated ACEs from current security descriptor. */
PACL oacl;
BOOLEAN acl_exists = FALSE;
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE *ace;
status = RtlGetDaclSecurityDescriptor (sd_ret, &acl_exists, &oacl, &dummy);
if (NT_SUCCESS (status) && acl_exists && oacl)
for (DWORD i = 0; i < oacl->AceCount; ++i)
if (NT_SUCCESS (RtlGetAce (oacl, i, (PVOID *) &ace)))
{
cygpsid ace_sid ((PSID) &ace->SidStart);
/* Always skip NULL SID as well as admins SID on virtual device files
in /proc/sys. */
if (ace_sid == well_known_null_sid
|| (S_ISCHR (attribute) && ace_sid == well_known_admins_sid))
continue;
/* Check for ACEs which are always created in the preceding code
and check for the default inheritence ACEs which will be created
for just created directories. Skip them for just created
directories or if they are not inherited. If they are inherited,
make sure they are *only* inherited, so they don't collide with
the permissions set in this function. */
if ((ace_sid == cur_owner_sid)
|| (ace_sid == owner_sid)
|| (ace_sid == cur_group_sid)
|| (ace_sid == group_sid)
|| (ace_sid == well_known_creator_owner_sid)
|| (ace_sid == well_known_creator_group_sid)
|| (ace_sid == well_known_world_sid))
{
if ((S_ISDIR (attribute) && (attribute & S_JUSTCREATED))
|| (ace->Header.AceFlags
& (SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT)) == 0)
continue;
else
ace->Header.AceFlags |= INHERIT_ONLY;
}
if (attribute & S_JUSTCREATED)
{
/* Since files and dirs are created with a NULL descriptor,
inheritence rules kick in. If no inheritable entries exist
in the parent object, Windows will create entries from the
user token's default DACL in the file DACL. These entries
are not desired and we drop them silently. */
if (!(ace->Header.AceFlags & INHERITED_ACE))
continue;
/* Remove the INHERITED_ACE flag since on POSIX systems
inheritance is settled when the file has been created.
This also avoids error messages in Windows Explorer when
opening a file's security tab. Explorer complains if
inheritable ACEs are preceding non-inheritable ACEs. */
ace->Header.AceFlags &= ~INHERITED_ACE;
/* However, if the newly created object is a directory,
it inherits the default ACL from its parent, so mark
all unrelated, inherited ACEs inheritable. */
if (S_ISDIR (attribute))
ace->Header.AceFlags |= SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT;
}
else if (uid == ILLEGAL_UID && gid == ILLEGAL_UID
&& ace->Header.AceType == ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE
&& ace_sid != well_known_creator_group_sid
&& ace_sid != well_known_creator_owner_sid
&& ace_sid != well_known_world_sid)
{
/* FIXME: Temporary workaround for the problem that chmod does
not affect the group permissions if other users and groups
in the ACL have more permissions than the primary group due
to the CLASS_OBJ emulation. The temporary workaround is to
disallow any secondary ACE in the ACL more permissions than
the primary group when writing a new ACL via chmod. */
ace->Mask &= group_allow;
}
/* Add unrelated ACCESS_DENIED_ACE to the beginning but behind
the owner_deny, ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE to the end. FIXME: this
would break the order of the inherit-only ACEs. */
status = RtlAddAce (acl, ACL_REVISION,
ace->Header.AceType == ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE
? (owner_deny ? 1 : 0) : MAXDWORD,
(LPVOID) ace, ace->Header.AceSize);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
return NULL;
}
acl_len += ace->Header.AceSize;
}
/* Construct appropriate inherit attribute for new directories. Keep in
mind that we do this only for the sake of non-Cygwin applications.
Cygwin applications don't need this. */
if (S_ISDIR (attribute) && (attribute & S_JUSTCREATED))
{
const DWORD inherit = SUB_CONTAINERS_AND_OBJECTS_INHERIT | INHERIT_ONLY;
/* Set allow ACE for owner. */
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, owner_allow,
well_known_creator_owner_sid, acl_len,
inherit))
return NULL;
/* Set allow ACE for group. */
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, group_allow,
well_known_creator_group_sid, acl_len,
inherit))
return NULL;
/* Set allow ACE for everyone. */
if (!add_access_allowed_ace (acl, other_allow, well_known_world_sid,
acl_len, inherit))
return NULL;
}
/* Set AclSize to computed value. */
acl->AclSize = acl_len;
debug_printf ("ACL-Size: %d", acl_len);
/* Create DACL for local security descriptor. */
status = RtlSetDaclSecurityDescriptor (&sd, TRUE, acl, FALSE);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
return NULL;
}
/* Make self relative security descriptor. */
DWORD sd_size = 0;
RtlAbsoluteToSelfRelativeSD (&sd, sd_ret, &sd_size);
if (sd_size <= 0)
{
__seterrno ();
return NULL;
}
if (!sd_ret.malloc (sd_size))
{
set_errno (ENOMEM);
return NULL;
}
status = RtlAbsoluteToSelfRelativeSD (&sd, sd_ret, &sd_size);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
__seterrno_from_nt_status (status);
return NULL;
}
debug_printf ("Created SD-Size: %u", sd_ret.size ());
return sd_ret;
}
void
set_security_attribute (path_conv &pc, int attribute, PSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES psa,
security_descriptor &sd)
@ -704,8 +363,9 @@ set_security_attribute (path_conv &pc, int attribute, PSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES psa,
psa->lpSecurityDescriptor = sd.malloc (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
RtlCreateSecurityDescriptor ((PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) psa->lpSecurityDescriptor,
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
psa->lpSecurityDescriptor = alloc_sd (pc, geteuid32 (), getegid32 (),
attribute, sd);
psa->lpSecurityDescriptor = set_posix_access (attribute, geteuid32 (),
getegid32 (), NULL, 0,
sd, false);
}
int
@ -744,8 +404,8 @@ get_object_attribute (HANDLE handle, uid_t *uidret, gid_t *gidret,
if (get_object_sd (handle, sd))
return -1;
get_posix_access (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret, NULL, 0);
return 0;
return get_posix_access (sd, attribute, uidret, gidret, NULL, 0) >= 0
? 0 : -1;
}
int
@ -754,7 +414,7 @@ create_object_sd_from_attribute (HANDLE handle, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
{
path_conv pc;
if ((handle && get_object_sd (handle, sd))
|| !alloc_sd (pc, uid, gid, attribute, sd))
|| !set_posix_access (attribute, uid, gid, NULL, 0, sd, false))
return -1;
return 0;
}
@ -786,24 +446,72 @@ set_object_attribute (HANDLE handle, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
}
int
set_file_attribute (HANDLE handle, path_conv &pc,
uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t attribute)
set_created_file_access (HANDLE handle, path_conv &pc, mode_t attr)
{
int ret = -1;
security_descriptor sd, sd_ret;
mode_t attr_rd;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
tmp_pathbuf tp;
aclent_t *aclp;
int nentries, idx;
if (pc.has_acls ())
if (!get_file_sd (handle, pc, sd, true))
{
security_descriptor sd;
if (!get_file_sd (handle, pc, sd, (bool)(attribute & S_JUSTCREATED))
&& alloc_sd (pc, uid, gid, attribute, sd))
ret = set_file_sd (handle, pc, sd,
uid != ILLEGAL_UID || gid != ILLEGAL_GID);
attr |= S_JUSTCREATED;
if (pc.isdir ())
attr |= S_IFDIR;
attr_rd = attr;
aclp = (aclent_t *) tp.c_get ();
if ((nentries = get_posix_access (sd, &attr_rd, &uid, &gid,
aclp, MAX_ACL_ENTRIES)) >= 0)
{
/* Symlinks always get the request POSIX perms. */
if (S_ISLNK (attr))
attr_rd = 0777;
/* Overwrite ACL permissions as required by POSIX 1003.1e
draft 17. */
aclp[0].a_perm = ((attr & attr_rd) >> 6) & S_IRWXO;
if (nentries > MIN_ACL_ENTRIES
&& (idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, CLASS_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm = ((attr & attr_rd) >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
else
aclp[1].a_perm = ((attr & attr_rd) >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
if ((idx = searchace (aclp, nentries, OTHER_OBJ)) >= 0)
aclp[idx].a_perm = (attr & attr_rd) & S_IRWXO;
/* Construct appropriate inherit attribute for new directories.
Basically we do this only for the sake of non-Cygwin applications.
Cygwin applications don't need these. Additionally, if the
S_ISGID bit is set, propagate it. */
if (S_ISDIR (attr))
{
if (searchace (aclp, nentries, DEF_USER_OBJ) < 0)
{
aclp[nentries].a_type = DEF_USER_OBJ;
aclp[nentries].a_id = ILLEGAL_UID;
aclp[nentries++].a_perm = (attr >> 6) & S_IRWXO;
}
if (searchace (aclp, nentries, DEF_GROUP_OBJ) < 0)
{
aclp[nentries].a_type = DEF_GROUP_OBJ;
aclp[nentries].a_id = ILLEGAL_GID;
aclp[nentries++].a_perm = (attr >> 3) & S_IRWXO;
}
if (searchace (aclp, nentries, DEF_OTHER_OBJ) < 0)
{
aclp[nentries].a_type = DEF_OTHER_OBJ;
aclp[nentries].a_id = ILLEGAL_UID;
aclp[nentries++].a_perm = attr & S_IRWXO;
}
if (attr_rd & S_ISGID)
attr |= S_ISGID;
}
if (set_posix_access (attr, uid, gid, aclp, nentries, sd_ret,
pc.fs_is_samba ()))
ret = set_file_sd (handle, pc, sd_ret, attr_rd & S_ISGID);
}
}
else
ret = 0;
syscall_printf ("%d = set_file_attribute(%S, %d, %d, 0%o)",
ret, pc.get_nt_native_path (), uid, gid, attribute);
return ret;
}