Avoid name change if script is called via symlink from execvp et al.
* spawn.cc (find_exec): Fix a name change in case of a symlink which can be opened as is. Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
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@ -104,13 +104,13 @@ find_exec (const char *name, path_conv& buf, const char *search,
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if ((has_slash || opt & FE_CWD)
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&& (suffix = perhaps_suffix (name, buf, err, opt)) != NULL)
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{
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/* Overwrite potential symlink target with original path.
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See comment preceeding this method. */
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tmp_path = tmp;
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if (!has_slash)
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{
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/* Overwrite potential symlink target with original path.
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See comment preceeding this method. */
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stpcpy (stpcpy (tmp, "./"), name);
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buf.set_posix (tmp);
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}
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tmp_path = stpcpy (tmp, "./");
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stpcpy (tmp_path, name);
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buf.set_posix (tmp);
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retval = buf.get_posix ();
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goto out;
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}
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