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* advapi32.cc (AccessCheck): Remove.

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(PrivilegeCheck): Remove.
	(OpenThreadToken): Remove.
	* fhandler_tty.cc: Replace above functions throughout with their
	ntdll.dll equivalent.
	* security.cc: Ditto.
This commit is contained in:
Corinna Vinschen
2011-04-29 09:48:25 +00:00
parent bd139e52b4
commit 3e8e0c33c0
4 changed files with 41 additions and 48 deletions
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26
winsup/cygwin/security.cc
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@@ -972,11 +972,11 @@ set_file_attribute (HANDLE handle, path_conv &pc,
static int
check_access (security_descriptor &sd, GENERIC_MAPPING &mapping,
DWORD desired, int flags, bool effective)
ACCESS_MASK desired, int flags, bool effective)
{
int ret = -1;
BOOL status;
DWORD granted;
NTSTATUS status, allow;
ACCESS_MASK granted;
DWORD plen = sizeof (PRIVILEGE_SET) + 3 * sizeof (LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES);
PPRIVILEGE_SET pset = (PPRIVILEGE_SET) alloca (plen);
HANDLE tok = ((effective && cygheap->user.issetuid ())
@@ -995,9 +995,11 @@ check_access (security_descriptor &sd, GENERIC_MAPPING &mapping,
tok = hProcImpToken;
}
if (!AccessCheck (sd, tok, desired, &mapping, pset, &plen, &granted, &status))
status = NtAccessCheck (sd, tok, desired, &mapping, pset, &plen, &granted,
&allow);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
__seterrno ();
else if (!status)
else if (!NT_SUCCESS (allow))
{
/* CV, 2006-10-16: Now, that's really weird. Imagine a user who has no
standard access to a file, but who has backup and restore privileges
@@ -1006,12 +1008,14 @@ check_access (security_descriptor &sd, GENERIC_MAPPING &mapping,
when returning the access status. Otherwise, why bother with the
pset parameter, right?
But not so. AccessCheck actually returns a status of "false" here,
even though opening a file with backup resp. restore intent
even though opening a file with backup resp. restore intent
naturally succeeds for this user. This definitely spoils the results
of access(2) for administrative users or the SYSTEM account. So, in
case the access check fails, another check against the user's
backup/restore privileges has to be made. Sigh. */
int granted_flags = 0;
BOOLEAN has_priv;
if (flags & R_OK)
{
pset->PrivilegeCount = 1;
@@ -1019,7 +1023,8 @@ check_access (security_descriptor &sd, GENERIC_MAPPING &mapping,
pset->Privilege[0].Luid.HighPart = 0L;
pset->Privilege[0].Luid.LowPart = SE_BACKUP_PRIVILEGE;
pset->Privilege[0].Attributes = 0;
if (PrivilegeCheck (tok, pset, &status) && status)
status = NtPrivilegeCheck (tok, pset, &has_priv);
if (NT_SUCCESS (status) && has_priv)
granted_flags |= R_OK;
}
if (flags & W_OK)
@@ -1029,7 +1034,8 @@ check_access (security_descriptor &sd, GENERIC_MAPPING &mapping,
pset->Privilege[0].Luid.HighPart = 0L;
pset->Privilege[0].Luid.LowPart = SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE;
pset->Privilege[0].Attributes = 0;
if (PrivilegeCheck (tok, pset, &status) && status)
status = NtPrivilegeCheck (tok, pset, &has_priv);
if (NT_SUCCESS (status) && has_priv)
granted_flags |= W_OK;
}
if (granted_flags == flags)
@@ -1047,7 +1053,7 @@ check_file_access (path_conv &pc, int flags, bool effective)
{
security_descriptor sd;
int ret = -1;
DWORD desired = 0;
ACCESS_MASK desired = 0;
if (flags & R_OK)
desired |= FILE_READ_DATA;
if (flags & W_OK)
@@ -1069,7 +1075,7 @@ check_registry_access (HANDLE hdl, int flags, bool effective)
KEY_WRITE,
KEY_EXECUTE,
KEY_ALL_ACCESS };
DWORD desired = 0;
ACCESS_MASK desired = 0;
if (flags & R_OK)
desired |= KEY_ENUMERATE_SUB_KEYS;
if (flags & W_OK)